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Abstract
In software engineering, formal methods are mathematical-based techniques that
are used in the specification, development and verification of algorithms and
programs in order to provide reliability and robustness of systems. One of the
most difficult challenges for software engineering is to tackle the complexity of al-
gorithms and software found in concurrent systems. Networked systems have come
to prominence in many aspects of modern life, and therefore software engineering
techniques for treating concurrency in such systems has acquired a particular im-
portance. Algorithms in the software of concurrent systems are used to accomplish
certain tasks which need to comply with the properties required of the system as a
whole. These properties can be broadly subdivided into ‘safety properties’, where
the requirement is ‘nothing bad will happen’, and ‘liveness properties’, where the
requirement is that ‘something good will happen’. As such, specifying network
algorithms and their safety and liveness properties through formal methods is the
aim of the research presented in this thesis. Since temporal logic has proved to be a
successful technique in formal methods, which have various practical applications
due to the availability of powerful model-checking tools such as the NuSMV model
checker, we will investigate the specification and verification of network algorithms
using temporal logic and model checking. In the first part of the thesis, we specify
and verify safety properties for network algorithms. We will use temporal logic to
prove the safety property of data consistency or serializability for a model of the
execution of an unbounded number of concurrent transactions over time, which
could represent software schedulers for an unknown number of transactions being
present in a network. In the second part of the thesis, we will specify and verify
the liveness properties of networked flooding algorithms.
Considering the above in more detail, the first part of this thesis specifies a
model of the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent transactions over
time in propositional Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) in order to prove serializability.
This is made possible by assuming that data items are ordered and that the
transactions accessing these data items respects this order, as then there is a bound
on the number of transactions that need to be considered to prove serializability.
In particular, we make use of recent work which places such bounds on the number
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of transactions needed when data items are accessed in order, but do not have to
be accessed contiguously, i.e., there may be ‘gaps’ in the data items being accessed
by individual transactions. Our aim is to specify the concurrent modification of
data held on routers in a network as a transactional model. The correctness of
the routing protocol and ensuring safety and reliability then corresponds to the
serializability of the transactions. We specify an example of routing in a network
and the corresponding serializability condition in LTL. This is then coded up
in the NuSMV model checker and proofs are performed. The novelty of this
part is that no previous research has used a method for detecting serializablity
and cycles for unlimited number of transactions accessing the data on routers
where the transactions way of accessing the data items on the routers have a gap.
In addition to this, linear temporal logic has not been used in this scenario to
prove correctness of the network system. This part is very helpful in network
administrative protocols where it is critical to maintain correctness of the system.
This safety property can be maintained using the presented work where detection
of cycles in transactions accessing the data items can be detected by only checking
a limited number of cycles rather than checking all possible cycles that can be
caused by the network transactions.
The second part of the thesis offers two contributions. Firstly, we specify the
basic synchronous network flooding algorithm, for any fixed size of network, in
LTL. The specification can be customized to any single network topology or class of
topologies. A specification for the termination problem is formulated and used to
compare different topologies with regards to earlier termination. We give a worked
example of one topology resulting in earlier termination than another, for which we
perform a formal verification using the NuSMV model checker. The novelty of the
second part comes in using linear temporal logic and the NuSMV model checker to
specify and verify the liveness property of the flooding algorithm. The presented
work shows a very difficult scenario where the network nodes are memoryless. This
makes detecting the termination of network flooding very complicated especially
with networks of complex topologies. In the literature, researchers focussed on
using testing and simulations to detect flooding termination. In this work, we used
a robust technique and a rigorous method to specify and verify the synchronous
flooding algorithm and its termination. We also showed that we can use linear
temporal logic and the model checker NuSMV to compare synchronous flooding
termination between topologies.
Adding to the novelty of the second contribution, in addition to the synchron-
ous form of the network flooding algorithm, we further provide a formal model
of bounded asynchronous network flooding by extending the synchronous flood-
ing model to allow a sent message, non-deterministically, to either be received
instantaneously, or enter a transit phase prior to being received. A generalization
of ‘rounds’ from synchronous flooding to the asynchronous case is used as a unit
of time to provide a measure of time to termination, as the number of rounds
taken, for a run of an asynchronous system. The model is encoded into temporal
logic and a proof obligation is given for comparing the termination times of asyn-
chronous and synchronous systems. Worked examples are formally verified using
the NuSMV model checker. This work offers a constraint-based methodology for
the verification of liveness properties of software algorithms distributed across the
nodes in a network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter presents a brief background to the research conducted, and an over-
view of the state-of-art (which will be presented in details in the Literature Review
Chapter), statement of the research problem, critical evaluation, aim, objectives,
contributions and then an overview to the thesis chapters.
1.1 Background
Software is used in different devices and systems to accomplish specific tasks ac-
cording to the device and environment. Many of the devices that we see around
us come with a software which controls it. The software that controls the working
of an Information and Communication Device is our interest. examples of such
devices include the automated teller machine (ATM) where the user inputs the
card key and make a selection of the amount of money required and an output
in cash is given to the user. An aeroplane is another example. Inputs can be
as location, weather, ...,etc. which will be given to the programs that control
the aeroplane in deciding its trajectory. Medical instruments such as a pacemaker
which is used to monitor and regulate the heartbeat of a human heart takes inputs
as signals of the heart and give outputs by the program as to control the heart-
beat. Autonomous cars are also another example of such systems and devices.
This type of program which controls these devices is called a controller of the
device. The controller listens to inputs and takes decisions and gives outputs as
shown in Figure 1.1.
1
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Controller 
Listens to input 
Gives output Action(s) 
Takes Decisions 
Figure 1.1: Safety-Critical Systems Controller Diagram.
Due to the high costs of errors in safety-critical systems, better software engin-
eering methods need to take place to avoid defects in controllers. While designing
controllers for safety-critical systems, it is important to ensure that the controller
is reliable and takes correct decisions which cover all possible scenarios. Usually,
the controllers come with a set of requirements that they need to satisfy. To
check if the controller satisfies its requirements, test cases can be used to find the
outcomes, but when the number of components that interact with the controller
increases, manual verification becomes increasingly difficult where some errors of
the controller can go unnoticed. A verification technology called model checking
can solve this problem. The approach to do the verification is by constructing
a mathematical model of the device controller and writing its requirements in
a formal notation. If the mathematical model of the controller satisfies the re-
quirements written in this formal notation, then this means that the controller
satisfies its requirements. This is done automatically which eliminates human
errors of manual proofs. Temporal logic proved to be a successful technique in
formal methods and can be used to specify the properties of critical systems.
This research focuses on using temporal logic on distributed systems as they
are considered reactive systems and have properties to be met. Reliability and
safety are two of the main concerns in critical computer-based systems. The jobs
running on these systems are not tolerant to errors in output. Concurrency makes
these systems very difficult to build and verify, especially in light of the emergence
of mobile systems. The transactions within concurrent systems require the use of
shared resources. The resources that are accessed and updated by such concurrent
transactions should leave the system in a consistent state, as having more than
one transaction attempting to access and update similar data items could leave
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the system in an inconsistent and unsafe state. If we look at networking systems,
we notice that the software used to make sure a certain packet is delivered from its
source to its destination, on routers in this instance, is built according to certain
routing algorithms. Routing protocols serve to specify the path by which data
packets are delivered to the specified destination. Routing protocols are usually
tested according to different situations and scenarios, but in these situations which
are not tested for there is the possibility that a system could malfunction or become
insecure.
This research considers maintaining the safety property, which means that
nothing bad will happen, in a distributed system where routers in a network have
data items that are shared by unlimited number of transactions. This is considered
a new contribution where unlimited number of transactions access data items in
with a ‘gap’, which will be defined later in Chapter 4. This contribution provides
easier cycle detection after calculating the gap. The contribution here provides
correctness for the network routers. Other research mainly focuses on testing/sim-
ulations. The method presented here explores all possible system states in a brute-
force manner. As concurrency can cause different problems in a system, specifying
the system and verifying it should be accomplished in a way which maintains the
system safety. Accessing the data items on routers can lead to having the data
being modified in an incorrect way which will violate the safety property of the
system. The transactions also need to be managed in by certain rules which leads
to a safe system state. A network protocol is presented in Chapter 4 to help main-
taining the safety property in distributed systems. The research also focuses on the
liveness property, something good will happen, in message passing distributed sys-
tems. The second and third contributions work with memory-less network flooding
where nodes on the network don’t have memory. The well-know synchronous and
asynchronous flooding algorithm is specified and verified. The termination of the
flooding algorithm is specified and verified using linear temporal logic (LTL) and
the NuSMV model checker. In the second contribution, we specify the basic syn-
chronous network flooding, for any fixed size of network, in LTL. The specification
can be customized to any single network topology or class of topologies. A spe-
cification for the termination problem is formulated and used to compare different
topologies with regards to earlier termination. A worked example is given of one
topology resulting in earlier termination than another, for which we perform a
formal verification using the NuSMV model checker. In the third contribution, we
provide a formal model of bounded asynchronous network flooding by extending
the synchronous flooding model to allow a sent message, non-deterministically, to
either be received instantaneously, or enter a transit phase prior to being received.
A generalization of ‘rounds’ from synchronous flooding to the asynchronous case is
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used as a unit of time to provide a measure of time to termination, as the number
of rounds taken, for a run of an asynchronous system. The model is encoded into
temporal logic to compare the termination times of asynchronous and synchronous
systems. Worked examples are formally verified using the NuSMV model checker.
This work offers a constraint-based methodology for the verification of liveness
properties of software algorithms distributed across the nodes in a network.
1.2 Overview of the state-of-art
State-of-the-art, formal methods, are used in system specifications, especially in
critical systems where the cost of failure could notably go beyond the cost of sys-
tem development. Formal methods are mathematical entities that can be used to
model the system in question, and are used to model system properties in a thor-
ough manner. Formal methods are mathematical-based techniques used for both
the specification and verification of software systems. The use of formal methods
in software engineering ensures a certain robustness and reliability to the final
product. Temporal logic has been used in specifying and verifying different prop-
erties of reactive systems. The ability of using temporal logic and model checking
to rigorously reason about the specifications properties in reactive systems is the
advantage which led to use them in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) field in
the computer technology, Air Traffic Control (ATC), autonomous vehicles, trains
signalling systems and many other safety-critical systems.
In distributed systems, testing and simulation is the main technique used.
As this covers only specific scenarios, faults can happen in the systems. In this
research we use formal methods to prove correctness. Mathematical proofs can
be done by an expert person in mathematics which for businesses is not always
considered. On the other hand, manual proof is liable to human error. In this
research we use linear temporal logic and the model checker NuSMV to carry
automatic proof which eliminates errors. Temporal logic is used to specify the
safety and liveness properties in network algorithms. The method used in this
research explores all possible system states in a brute-force manner leading to
building rigorous systems.
1.3 Statement of the research
problem/knowledge gap
Temporal logics have been used in the specification and verification of safety and
liveness properties of concurrent transactions in databases systems. This research
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
investigates the application of linear temporal logic to distributed systems which
include shared resources accessed by different transactions. It also investigates the
application of linear temporal logic to other networks with message passing and
no memory. It look to specify and verify the safety and correctness of concurrency
with respect to collections of different transactions accessing data in different ways.
It also looks to specify liveness property of memory-less flooding algorithm. The
research is a combination of theoretical modelling and practical specification and
verification using a temporal logic model checker NuSMV.
1.4 Critical evaluation
Linear temporal logic proved to be a good technique in specifying different network
algorithms properties. It showed that it can check for safety property as for the
first contribution. The livenss property was specified in the second and third con-
tribution using temporal logic. Termination of the synchronous and asynchronous
flooding algorithm is specified in this research in linear temporal logic. This shows
that linear temporal logic is a powerful method and can be used to specify network
algorithms and its properties. In the case that a property was not met, the model
checker gives a counterexample showing the states that cause the error. The states
represent a trace which can be helpful in defining the error. Linear temporal lo-
gic is chosen in this research over other techniques as first-order temporal logic
because there are practical and theoretical obstacles to formal verification in such
logics. LTL is used also due to the nature of the problem of flooding where all
messages that arrive ‘at the same time’ are aggregated into the same round, this
has ruled out standard process calculi approaches such as CSP [1] and CCS [2],
which only allow two processes at a time to synchronize sending and receiving of
messages.
Even with the specifications presented in this research, and the use of one of
the most powerful model checkers available, NuSMV, proofs will only be possible
in practice for fairly small sizes of network. A strong mathematical background
can help in solving and proving some problems where data is accessed in different
ways other than what is presented in this work. Some problems faced during this
research will need more time and effort to tackle in addition to higher mathematical
skills.
1.5 Aim
Applying linear temporal logic to specify and verify safety and livness properties
in distributed systems.
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1.6 Objectives
The objectives of this research are as as follows:
• Investigate the usage of temporal logic and select appropriate one(s) for the
research in addition to selecting a model checker and learning using it.
• Review the literature of the field.
• Find distributed systems problems that can be specified and verified using
temporal logic.
• Investigate how data is accessed on routers and if can be modelled.
• Apply theoretical work to the model when matching.
• Use a model checker to verify the properties over the model.
• Provide conclusions and possible future work.
1.7 Contributions
This work provides three contributions. The first contribution specifies a model
of the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent transactions over time
in propositional Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) in order to prove serializability. It
uses recent work which places bounds on the number of transactions needed when
data items are accessed in order, but do not have to be accessed contiguously, i.e.,
there may be ‘gaps’ in the data items being accessed by individual transactions.
The aim of this contribution is to specify the concurrent modification of data held
on routers in a network as a transactional model. The correctness of the routing
protocol and ensuring safety and reliability then corresponds to the serializability
of the transactions. Verification of the software of administrative routing protocols
is expected to be one of the main applications of this work.
The second contribution works on memory-less flooding. We specify the basic
synchronous network flooding algorithm, for any fixed size of network, in LTL.
The specification can be customized to any single network topology or class of
topologies. A specification for the termination problem is formulated and used
to compare different topologies with regards to earlier termination. A worked
example is given of one topology resulting in earlier termination than another, for
which we perform a formal verification using the NuSMV model checker.
The third contribution provides a formal model of bounded asynchronous net-
work flooding by extending the synchronous flooding model to allow a sent mes-
sage, non-deterministically, to either be received instantaneously, or enter a transit
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phase prior to being received. A generalization of ‘rounds’ from synchronous flood-
ing to the asynchronous case is used as a unit of time to provide a measure of time
to termination, as the number of rounds taken, for a run of an asynchronous sys-
tem. The model is encoded into temporal logic. It also compares the termination
times of asynchronous and synchronous systems. Worked examples are formally
verified using the NuSMV model checker. This work offers a constraint-based
methodology for the verification of liveness properties of software algorithms dis-
tributed across the nodes in a network.
1.8 Overview of thesis chapters
The second chapter will provide a research background. The third chapter provides
literature review, motivation, and research methodology. The first, second, and
third contributions are presented in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 respect-
ively. Chapter 6.5 provides general contributions and future work. Appendices
are provided at the end of the thesis.
Chapter 2
Research Background
Software complexity has increased rapidly in recent years due to the increased
complexity of the systems using the software. To create software that can accom-
plish certain requirements requires that such software first needs to be specified
in the early stages of development as per these requirements, and at a later stage
needs to be verified against those requirements to ensure that they have been prop-
erly met. With the increase in demand to provide reliable software, especially in
critical systems, software engineers must avoid introducing errors into their soft-
ware and attempt to verify that the requirements specified by the client are met.
The software in reactive systems, where the system consists of different parts that
react together and with the environment, requires that certain properties must
be satisfied, amongst which are safety and liveness. Network systems consist of
software which is designed to achieve certain tasks over the network. Different
network algorithms are used in these systems to achieve particular tasks, and en-
suring that these have been specified and verified using a rigorous method avoids
the introduction of errors into these systems. Formal methods, and specifically
Temporal Logics, have been used by different systems to specify and verify soft-
ware so as to achieve the required properties in these systems due to their power
in these regards. In this thesis, temporal logic will be used to specify and verify
network algorithms with respect to safety and liveness. The safety property will
be examined in the first part of the thesis, namely in Chapter 4. The second part
of this thesis will examine the liveness property, as discussed in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. In Chapter 4, we will investigate the use of Linear Temporal Logic
LTL to specify and verify the concurrent modification of data on the routers in a
network as a transactional model in order to prove serializability. The correctness
of the routing protocol, and ensuring safety and reliability, can then be said to
correspond to the serializability of the associated transactions. In Chapter 5, we
will specify a basic synchronous network flooding algorithm, for any fixed size of
network, in Linear Temporal Logic. A specification of the termination problem
8
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is formulated and is used to compare different topologies in terms of earlier ter-
mination. Chapter 6 provides a formal model of bounded asynchronous network
flooding by extending the model of synchronous flooding to allow a sent message
to either be received instantaneously, or enter a transit phase prior to being re-
ceived, in a non-deterministic manner. The model is encoded into temporal logic
and a proof obligation is given in terms of comparing the termination times for
asynchronous and synchronous systems. This chapter will give an introduction to
the different concepts and techniques that will be used in the thesis in addition to
a number of examples of system failures.
Different business, and indeed the public sector, have certain, unique standards
for the products they deliver which are ultimately to limit the potential for physical
or economic damage. Smartphones users, for instance, would become upset at
any faults or failures in their devices because of wrong or unexpected results.
However, such system failures clearly do not cause physical harm to the users;
rather, they have the potential to cause economic damage. This kind of failure can
negatively impact the companies using these systems. For instance, in September
2016 Samsung recalled 2.5 million Note 7 phones due to a manufacturing issue
with their batteries that resulted in overheating [3], in some instances resulting in
severe burns being inflicted on a large number of customers. The BBC reported
that this recall was believed to have cost Samsung $5.3 bn, who ultimately recalled
this smartphone to ensure the safety of its customers. Samsung offered either a
replacement or a refund [3].
In stock market trading and e-business, users access data remotely via different
forms of transactions in what can be described as a highly mobile environment. For
instance, If the stocks trader receives inconsistent data, he/she may accordingly
make a poor decision and will be negatively affected in a financial, though not
physical, sense. For example, if a transaction has to read more than one data ele-
ment that is being broadcast by the server to the clients, the client needs to receive
consistent and correct data. One might consider a trader exchanging dollars in
one country whilst another makes the same exchange in another country through
the same exchange company; if the data is not fresh on both sides, they can re-
ceive different amounts of money. This example shows the seriousness of having
a correctly specified and verified scheduling algorithm. In database management,
the system responsible for managing data concurrency and consistency is called
the scheduler [4]. Its responsibility is to schedule different concurrent transactions
containing reads and writes of a set of data items. Choosing an appropriate and
accurate schedule is thus essential to ongoing database integrity.
Critical computer systems are very strict and their failure is not acceptable;
the negative impact that might result from a software or operational defect should
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be prevented at all costs. The famous chip manufacturer, Intel, lost about 475
million US dollars because of a design fault in its Pentium II processor, which was
discovered in 1994 [5]. Patient information can be collected during the normal
life of the patient without requiring that they be hospitalized using mobile tech-
nologies. Every year we see new health technologies intended to improve patient
health and/or lifestyle. Healthcare is becoming increasingly reliant on technology
to perform its various operations. When the issue is one of health, such opera-
tions become even more critical. At least six cancer patients died due to radiation
overexposure caused by the software controlling a Therac-25 radiation therapy
machine in 1985-1987 [6]. This bug was a direct result of concurrent programming
errors. As a result of software malfunctions, passengers have died in aircraft, car,
and train accidents. A fatal Airbus crash in May 2015, where an Airbus A400M
crashed in Spain, was because of engine control software issues [7]. In August 2007,
Skype experienced a critical disruption due to massive restarts of users [8] as a
result of an error in the associated software.This problem was ultimately found to
have occurred due to an unexpected number of users trying to concurrently access
the systems. The software ultimately had to be updated on users’ systems and
then reconnected to the service, and because of restarts of those users, the system
had a huge number of transactions representing connections to the service by their
users [8].
With the increase of the number of the interactive systems, the potential for
defects increases exponentially [5]. Specifying and verifying the correctness of
the software in such environments should be undertaken to ensure proper fault
avoidance. In September 2017, a check-in system failure created chaos at airports
across the world [9]. The biggest airports worldwide, including London Heathrow,
Charles de Gaulle in Paris, Changi in Singapore and Washington DC’s Reagan Air-
port, amongst others, were affected because of this failure. The check-in software
responsible was provided by a company called Amadeus, who specialize in travel
technology, confirmed that this failure was a result of a network issue. Passengers
affected by this problem had their flights either delayed or cancelled. Airport per-
sonnel were unable to provide the details required by these passengers until the
system started working again; in such situations, airline companies are required
to compensate travellers, which will clearly cost them large amounts of money
[9]. The network software in these and other communication systems handle very
large amounts of data transmission and large numbers of transactions, and so net-
work algorithms which have not been formally specified and verified could cause
unexpected issues at some unknown point in the future.
This research focusses on the specification and verification of network al-
gorithms using temporal logic. The problems that occurred as listed above, and
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indeed that have occurred in many other systems, indicate the need to to use
robust methods of software engineering. This thesis focusses on the software part
of communication, in particular on the networking algorithms used in networking
systems. The following section will discuss the different areas of software engin-
eering and the importance of the software requirements and the verification part
of the software. Section 2.2 introduces the formal methods used to address these
purposes and the importance of their use in software engineering. Section 2.3 in-
troduces the definitions used in this thesis with regards to database transactions
in addition to describing some of their more important properties. This section
represents an important prelude to Chapter 4, which discusses data modification
on network routers. Section 2.4 gives an introduction to distributed systems and
distributed algorithms, which are discussed further in Chapter 5 and Chapter
6. In Section 2.5, temporal logic is introduced in addition to temporal proper-
ties and temporal operators; temporal logic is used in this thesis to specify and
verify network problems. After this, Section 2.6 discusses model checking and its
importance.
2.1 Better Software Engineering
Software engineering starts from the early stages of the software specification,
and typically ends with the maintenance of the software. This is of particular
importance when considering financial constraints. Tools, theories and methods
are used in software engineering to successfully create software with the required
standards. The most elementary steps of software engineering consist of software
specification, development, validation and evolution [10]. In a business sense,
companies will attempt to produce reliable and trustworthy software for their
clients while keeping minimizing the revenue required to achieve this goal.
Some of the most important steps in software engineering are the specifica-
tion and verification of the software. Selecting higher standard specification and
verification methods for reactive and concurrent systems implies highers level of
dependability. Software specification represents that start of the software engin-
eering process’s activities. The specification starts when software engineers meet
with their customers and gain a comprehensive description of the software to be
developed and its constraints. Poor or incorrect specifications or misunderstand-
ings will lead to a system that does not meet the customer’s needs, which in the
extreme can lead to financial loss for both the software production company and
the user alike [11]. This demonstrates the serious need to form specifications that
correctly describe the required system. Later in the system development process,
the system will need to be checked to meet the requirements of the customer.
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This process is called verification. Verification is tested against the current spe-
cifications for the software; in critical systems, this is a crucial step in determining
and demonstrating their correctness. Using formal methods and model checking
to both specify and verify software is considered to provide reliable software that
meets the associated requirements.
Figure 2.1 shows a famous cartoon drawing of creating a swing and reflecting
the idea during software development. It shows how incorrect or misunderstood
specifications can lead to unintended results.
Figure 2.1: A graphic representation of problems resulting from errors in specific-
ations
2.2 Formal Methods
State-of-the-art, formal methods, are used in system specifications, especially in
critical systems where the cost of failure could notably go beyond the cost of
system development. Formal methods are mathematical entities that can be used
to model the system in question, and are used to model system properties in a
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 13
thorough manner. Formal methods are mathematical-based techniques used for
both the specification and verification of software systems. The use of formal
methods in software engineering ensures a certain robustness and reliability to the
final product.
The quality of the results that can be obtained by applying formal methods
in verifying critical systems has led to their extensive use by software engineers.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reported that formal
methods should be part of every software engineer’s and computer scientist’s edu-
cation [5]. To provide an ultra-detailed verification of the system, the appropriate
properties should be defined and specified in a precise manner.
In critical systems, the major approaches used to specify and verify the cor-
rectness of the concurrency control protocol are those of mathematical proofs.
Mathematical proofs need a person with high levels of experience in mathem-
atics, which makes their use difficult in the software development industry [12].
In addition to this need, mathematical proofs could themselves have errors due
to human error. Using automated proofs as available model checkers to model
systems formally according to their specifications and to prove their correctness
saves time and avoids human error. In this manner, the desired properties can be
verified using an exhaustive search of all possible states that the system can enter
during execution. Model checkers can provide different and interesting features
by observing the different states the system goes through. In NuSMV, in case a
certain property is not met, a counterexample is given showing how the system did
not comply with the property. This research will use formal methods, specifically
temporal logic and model checkers, to specify and verify network algorithms and
their properties.
2.3 Basics of Database and Transactions
This section will provide an introduction to the basics of databases and database
transactions; it will also introduce concurrency and the need to control concur-
rency. This section will be helpful as an introduction to Chapter 4 as the topics
discussed here provide an excellent guide to concurrency problems when modifying
data on network routers.
A database is defined as a collection of related data which is organized so
that it can easily be accessed, managed, and updated [4]. This database can
vary according to its type and to different organizations. A transaction is a se-
quence of database operations performed by the execution of a program. Database
transactions entail, for instance, banking functions, reservations, and stock mar-
ket functions, amongst many others. If a person is to book a flight, they will
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very likely access a booking page to check for the availability of flights from their
departure to their destination airports. Different airlines may operate at differ-
ent stages of their journey. The customer will thus be accessing a database that
combines different airlines with the different airports on their journey, whilst the
booking of the flight itself represents the transaction they make on the database.
Once the customer books their ticket, their details will be used to reserve seats on
the flight(s) on this journey. The first step, that of searching for the flight, rep-
resents a read operation from the database; the booking step represents the write
operation. The plane will have certain places available for travellers. Once the
traveller books a ticket, the availability of seats for other travellers will, obviously,
be reduced. A booking system should run without faults and ensure that certain
properties are met, for instance, that no two travellers can book the same seat;
if all seats are reserved, the system should not allow any further bookings to be
made on that flight. Other properties must hold in such systems where different
transactions by different users could potentially attempt to access the database
simultaneously. We can imagine how such issues have grown exponentially with
today’s mobile technologies. A person can nowadays book a ticket for a trip using
his/her smart-phone in a very straightforward manner.
Concurrency is one of the topics that has been considered for decades and
indeed has grown with new mobile technologies. The scheduler is the database
system component that handles concurrency control. The scheduler is an essen-
tial component of transaction processing systems that deals with users running
concurrent transactions. The scheduler produces schedules which represent the
interleaved execution of these transactions. The schedule is also sometimes called
a history. A transaction can perform the following database operations:
• Access operation (read operation): fetches the data value of a data item x.
This is denoted by Read(x).
• Update operation (write operation): updates the value of a data item x.
This is denoted by Write(x).
The database is a representation of part of the real world [12, 13, 14]. This
means that its state is governed and controlled. An example is that a person’s
weight cannot be negative. Another example is that only a definite number of
passengers can be seated in an aircraft according to its number of seats. Such
restrictions are referred to as integrity constraints, which create a framework to
ensure that data consistency is valid when any user performs an operation that
will result in a change to the database. A database is said to be in its consistent
state at a certain time if all data element values are valid according to the integrity
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constraints. If a transaction is to commit, it should maintain the database is in
its consistent state. Four properties of transactions (known as ACID properties)
should be valid when transactions are executing in the database to preserve its
consistency. Furthermore, in an environment where multiple transactions are ex-
ecuting, the database management system (DBMS) must schedule the concurrent
execution of the transactions steps. The schedule of these transactions operations
must have the property of being serializable [4]. To understand more of the re-
quired properties, we should review these properties and what they mean. The
first four properties are the ACID properties:
Atomicity: All operations of a transaction are required to be complete or else the
transaction is aborted. The transaction is treated as a single unit.
Consistency: A transaction is aborted if any part of it violates an integrity con-
straint. It should keep the database in a consistent state to commit.
Isolation: In a concurrency environment, simultaneously running transaction be-
haviours do not affect each other. Access to shared resources must be serialized
by the transactions.
Durability: Once a transaction is committed, the changes its makes cannot be
undone. Effects should also not be lost, even in the instance of a system failure.
Serializability: Results of schedules in an environment where transactions are ex-
ecuted concurrently should maintain a consistent system.
After understanding the different properties, we should consider transaction
concurrency, and why it is important to control it, further. This is considered in
the following section.
2.3.1 Importance of Concurrency Control
In an environment with multiple transactions accessing shared data and that are
executed in parallel, concurrency control is needed to avoid any undesirable situ-
ation that can violate the consistency of the database. In other words, the DBMS
needs to preserve some or all ACID properties in such environments [12, 15].
Without concurrency control, transactions running simultaneously over a shared
database can create data integrity and consistency issues. The following example
explains the first problem:
Suppose that we have two transactions (Transaction1, Transaction2) accessing
a data item x in a database. The item x has an initial value of 5 (x = 5).
Transaction1: Read(x);x = x− 3;Write(x);
Transaction2: Read(x);x = x+ 7;Write(x);
The concurrent execution of the two transactions is represented in Table 2.1.
In Table 2.1, the final value of x is 12. If the transaction were executed in a se-
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Table 2.1: Two transactions executing simultaneously.
Step Transaction 1 Transaction 2
1 Read(x)
2 x = x− 3
3 Read(x)
4 x = x+ 7
5 Write(x)
6 Write(x) ← older value is cancelled
quential order, the final value of x would be x = 9. We can conclude from this that
the value yielded by the concurrent transactions is incorrect. It is clear that the
reason for this incorrect value of x is that the second transaction, (Transaction2),
reads the value of x before the first transaction (Transaction1) changes it in the
database. As a consequence, the change resulting from the first transaction is lost
(overwritten). This problem is known as the lost update problem. To take another
example, let us assume that we have a bus with (x) seats reserved (x = 9). The
total limit number of passengers who can book seats is 16. The first transaction
cancels 6 seats reservation (x = x − 6). The second transaction reserves seven
seats (x = x+ 10). Hence, the final value of reserved seats should be 13 (x = 13).
The concurrent execution of the two transactions is represented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Bus tickets - two transactions executing simultaneously.
Step Transaction 1 Transaction 2
1 Read(x)
2 x = x− 6
3 Read(x)
4 x = x+ 10
5 Write(x)
6 Write(x) ← older value is cancelled
If we look at the interleaving operations of both transactions in Table 2.2, the
final value is 19 (x = 19). We can conclude from this example that this value
yielded by the concurrent transactions is wrong and the reservation limit has been
reached (or exceeded). It is clear that the reason for this incorrect value of x is
that the second transaction, (Transaction2), reads the value of x before the first
transaction (Transaction1) has changed x in the database. As a consequence, the
changes resulting from the first transaction are lost (overwritten).
When a transaction finishes its steps successfully it is said that the transac-
tion has committed successfully. A well-known problem when dealing with the
concurrent execution of transactions on a shared data item is known as a dirty
read (or temporary update), where a transaction reads a data element which has
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been updated by another transaction but where the first transaction has not yet
committed [13, 16]. The problem occurs when the transaction that modified the
data item has not finished and rolls back for a certain failure. To demonstrate
this problem, consider the following example:
Suppose that we have two transactions (Transaction1, Transaction2) accessing
a data item x in a database. The item x has an initial value of 10 (x = 10).
Transaction1: Read(x);x = x− 3;Write(x);
Transaction2: Read(x);x = x+ 7;Write(x);
The concurrent execution of the two transactions is represented in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Dirty read problem example
Step Transaction 1 Transaction 2
1 Read(x)
2 x = x− 6
3 Write(x)
4 Read(x) ← Dirty read
5 x = x+ 10
6 Write(x)
7 ABORT (Failure)
We can see from Table 2.3 that Transaction1 encounters a failure before com-
mitting and Transaction1 reads the shared data item x after Transaction1 has
modified it. In this case, Transaction1’s failure will cause it to abort and to be
rolled back (restarted), while Transaction2 does not restart. Transaction2, in this
scenario, will have read a value of x that is now is never considered to have existed,
resulting in an inconsistency in the database. If Transaction1 finishes successfully,
however, then the database will remain in a consistent state.
Other problems could arise in a concurrent environment such as an unrepeat-
able read. The unrepeatable read problem is encountered when the first transac-
tion reads several values and the second transaction updates some of these values
while the first transaction is being executed [13, 16]. Such problems can occur in an
environment where concurrent transactions executions exist, hence violating the
ACID properties. The lost update problem causes a violation in the consistency
and isolation properties. This is because the state of the database is inconsistent
after executing these transactions.
In Chapter 4, we will focus on specifying and verifying the isolation property,
which is the responsibility of the concurrency control system. The isolation prop-
erty guarantees that any transactions that are executed concurrently will result
in a system state similar to the state that would result from transactions being
executed serially (i.e., without any transaction interleaving).
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We have now provided an introduction to the basics of database transactions,
which will be the main topic of Chapter 4 which describes data modification
on network routers via concurrent transactions. After having provided this short
introduction on the need for concurrency control, we will now introduce distributed
systems and some of the concepts of the flooding algorithm which will be the topic
of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
2.4 Distributed Systems
Distributed systems are systems of multiple components that interact with each
other. There are two types of distributed systems: shared memory distributed
systems, where components share the same memory, for example a multi-core
processor in a CPU; and message-passing distributed systems, where the individual
components interact with each other through messages sent on links and which
corresponds to computer networks. In this thesis, we concentrate on message-
passing distributed systems.
The components of message-passing systems use the messages passed between
them to communicate and process different tasks. Message-passing systems have
characteristics which include the concurrency of components, independent failure
of components, and the lack of a global clock. The interaction of the different
components and the message passing required between them to accomplish a cer-
tain job is considered difficult in terms of the lack of a global clock. Processing
the job can be achieved in a parallel manner between the different elements of the
distributed system. In a distributed system, the different components all have the
same goal as the outcome of their work.
Distributed network routing algorithms deal with directing and redirecting
messages between different network routers and end points [17]. In this thesis,
routers and endpoints are referred to as nodes. The router’s job is to send the
message to one of its neighbours - to which it has a connection - in order to
deliver the message to its destination. [17]. Distributed network algorithms can be
classified as synchronous distributed algorithms, where a ‘global’ clock is assumed
to exist in the system and messages are sent during the same clock tick. The other
classification is asynchronous distributed algorithms, where messages are not sent
at exactly the same time or during the same clock tick. In this thesis, each of
these types are considered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 on a well-known network
algorithm called the flooding algorithm [18]. The phenomenon of flooding forms
the basis of many important distributed processes [19].
The flooding algorithm is an algorithm which utilizes every path in the network
[20]. As the algorithm specifies, one of the nodes will start to send a message to
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all of its neighbours. When any given node receives a message from a neighbour,
it forwards the same message to all of its neighbours except the one(s) it received
the message from [21, 20, 18, 22]. Synchronous distributed algorithms assume
a ‘global clock’ where actions happen during clock ticks or rounds. This means
that the network has bounded link delays and a lockstep synchronization with the
pulses of the global clock. In the message synchronization property, a message
sent from node v to neighbour u at pulse p of v must be delivered to u before
pulse p+ 1 of u [20].
In this thesis, we investigate ‘memoryless’ flooding where a node does not
explicitly remember if it has previously taken part in the process or which nodes
it has previously interacted with. This may happen, for example, if the node
does not have enough memory to store its past history or if there are multiple
flooding operations occurring which it does not want to, or cannot, distinguish. It
does, however, know which node(s) sent it the message in the present round and
forwards copies of the message to all its neighbours with the exception(s) of the
one(s) it received it from. Notice that if in any round a node receives the message
from all its neighbours, the node does not need to do anything. If at some point
no node forwards the message, we say that the flooding has terminated. It is
hard to know if the flooding process will ever terminate, however, especially in
complicated topologies with cycles.
To gain a visual understanding of the synchronous flooding algorithm and how
it works, and indeed the termination problem, we present some examples below.
The first example will show a sequence of nodes connected in a line, as illustrated
in Figure 2.2(a)-(d). A node with a message is shown as double circled.
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 20
(a) Round 0
(b) Round 1
(c) Round 2
(d) Round 3
(e) After flooding finished
Figure 2.2: Flooding - line connection.
The nodes are connected bidirectionally; this means that each individual line
connecting the nodes can carry a message in both directions. In round 0 a message
is at node 0, as shown in Figure 2.2(a). In the first round, a message is sent from
the initial node 0 to its neighbour, node 1, as shown in Figure 2.2(b). In the second
round, each neighbour which received the message will forward this to all of its
own neighbours, except for those from which the message was received. As node 1
has two neighbours (node 1 and node 2), it can send the received the message from
node 0 to node 2 according to the algorithm, as shown in round 2. Eventually, all
the nodes in the network will receive a message in a certain round, and where this
is achieved in round 3, as shown in Figure 2.2(d). After node 3 has received the
message it will not be forwarded to any of 3’s neighbours as its only neighbour is
node 2, but this is the node from which the message was received. At this stage,
the flooding of the message terminates. Flooding on the network of Figure 2.2
shows that the flooding can be terminated. Figure 2.2(e) shows the network after
flooding has stopped. If the initial node were any other than the one considered in
this example, we can see easily that flooding will again terminate. Let us consider
another example of synchronous flooding on a different network, as illustrated in
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Figure 2.3. This example shows a ring network of five nodes.
As we can see in 2.3, in round 0 the message is at node 0, as shown in Figure
2.3(a). Node 0 has two neighbours, nodes 1 and 2. In round 1, the message is sent
to both of these neighbours. In round 2, the message at node 1 will only be sent
to node 3, as it cannot be sent to the other neighbour, node 0, as it received the
message from this node originally. Similarly, for node 2, the message will be sent
to node 4. As shown in Figure 2.3(c), node 3 and node 4 now have a message.
Each of the nodes will send the message in the next round to the neighbour from
which it did not receive the message from in the previous round. Node 3 will send
its message to node 4 and node 4 will forward its message to node 3 in round 3,
as shown in Figure 2.3(d). In the next round (round 4), node 3 will forward the
message to node 1 and node 4 will forward the message to node 2, as shown in
Figure 2.3(e). In round 5, the message at node 1 will be forwarded to node 0 and
the message at node 2 will be forwarded to node 0, as shown in Figure 2.3(f).
Since node 0 has received a message from both node 1 and node 2, the flooding
will terminate as node 0 does not send to the neighbours it has received from.
Figure 2.3(g) shows the network after flooding has terminated.
Another example of synchronous flooding is shown in Figure 2.4.
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 22
(a) Round 0 (b) Round 1 (c) Round 2
(d)Round 3 (e)Round 4 (f)Round 5
(g) After flooding finished.
Figure 2.3: Flooding - ring connection.
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(a) Round 0 (b) Round 1
(c) Round 2 (d) Round 3
(e) After flooding finished
Figure 2.4: Flooding - triangle connection.
We can see, as shown in Figure 2.4(a)-(d), that the message was at node 0 a
the start of flooding and was forwarded in each round until the flooding stopped.
The message at node 0 was forwarded to node 1 and node 2 in round 1. In round
2, the message was forwarded from node 2 to node 1 and from node 1 to node 2, as
shown in 2.4(c). In round 3, the message from node 2 and node 1 was sent to node
0 as shown in Figure 2.4(d). At this stage, the flooding terminates as node 0 will
not forward the message to any of its neighbours as it received a message from each
of them in the previous round. Figure 2.4(e) shows the network after flooding has
terminated. Flooding termination can be more complicated depending on network
topology and number of nodes. If we consider Figure 2.5, for example, then it is
clear that tracing the flood of messages will be more challenging than in the earlier
examples.
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Figure 2.5: Flooding - 2 ring connection
Node 0 is the initial node with the message at round 0. Its neighbours will
receive the forwarded message in round 1. Each neighbour receiving the message
will forward it to its neighbours in the next round. The flooding will continue to
ensure that all nodes in the network receive the message. In this example, flooding
will, in fact, terminate, though as implied earlier this is not necessarily the case.
The situation is also more challenging when flooding is asynchronous.
If we take the flooding example illustrated in Figure 2.4 and assume in this
instance that the flooding is asynchronous, this means that the messages are not
sent and delivered at the same time. If the initial message was at node 0 and
the message is forwarded to neighbour nodes 1 and 2, in asynchronous flooding
delivery to neighbours can occur at different times, which makes predicting flood
termination far more difficult. This means that the message can be delivered to
one node but not delivered to the other as it is still in transit. The one which
receives the message will forward the message to its neighbours according to the
flooding algorithm, with the exception of the one it received it from. This scenario
can cause loops, hence flooding might not terminate.
2.5 Temporal Logic
In mathematics, classical propositional logic formulae are interpreted as truth
values, either “true” or “false” [23], and which is absolute. The truth values of the
formulae are fixed after the propositional variables have been mapped to the truth
values. In reality, we need to consider the changes that happen in our universe.
For statements like ‘I am wearing a jacket’ or ‘it is snowing’, it is clear that their
truth value can, and likely will, change over time. A person can wear a jacket
when it is cold and snowing on one day but will take it off when it is warm or
sunny on another. In other words, the valuation of the statements can change
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with time. This need to represent changes has led to the introduction of temporal
logic.
Temporal logic is used to represent reasoning about a changing world [24] where
the formula’s truth values may vary over time [12]. The importance of temporal
logic is to address time-dependent valuations. Temporal logic is an extension of
classical propositional logic. Facts about the past, present, and future states can
be expressed in the formulae of temporal logic. Temporal logic has been used
extensively in the representation of temporal information because the concept of
time is inherent to the logic. Today’s computer system requirements are rapidly
increasing, especially with the emergence of smart mobile devices including mobile
phones and other smart devices that can be used in different places. The varying
states of the systems over time require that special tools must be used to specify
and verify their states; modelling changes in such time-dependent systems can be
achieved using temporal logic. Temporal logic can be used to specify the different
properties of a system. A system state which changes over time can be represented
using temporal logic formulae. Examples of what temporal logic can represent are
encapsulated in the following statements: ‘the network is always running’ , ‘a sent
message will be delivered in the future’ , ‘if I pay for my order, I will receive it
eventually’ , ‘a car system will use the car brakes whenever a car is closer to the car
in front’. Temporal logic provides the ability to reason about a time-line. Linear
temporal logic (LTL) adopts this type of reasoning. The LTL model of time is like
a line, are a so-called path. Computational tree logic (CTL) is a type of temporal
logic which includes a branching logic, where time is modelled using a tree-like
structure.
Due to the power of temporal logic, specification and verification of concurrent
and reactive systems makes significant use of temporal logic [23]. E-commerce
and traffic control systems are examples of such systems, where at the same time
an error in this type of system is considered fatal. Both software and hardware
engineers dealing with critical systems do not rely purely on testing their systems,
as these need to be further specified and verified in such a way as to match the
desired requirements to minimize the possibility of errors. Demonstrating these
requirements in a rigorous manner requires a highly skilled mathematician. An
important factor to take into consideration is that a mathematician is still human,
and human error is always a possibility. Another problem is that it is not always
easy to accomplish the proof if there is a mathematician with high skills. The
solution to overcoming this problem is to use automatic model checkers, which
will avoid human error. The different properties required of a system can be
encoded within the temporal logic of a model checker.
Model checkers that use different types of temporal logic were developed as
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they have the ability to verify real-world systems in a short time, which is par-
ticularly useful considering these systems have a massive number of states. After
the system-required properties are encoded into the temporal logic in the model
checker, it then checks all different possible states of the system to verify the prop-
erties. In the well-known model checker NuSMV, if a property is not satisfied a
counterexample will be given illustrating the states of the system where the prop-
erty is not satisfied. Temporal logic is helpful for specifying concurrent systems by
describing event ordering over time. With the exponential growth of technologies
and concurrent systems, these systems have become more complicated and their
interactions more critical. This means that the specification and verification of
their properties is essential [25, 26]. The following subsection discusses these dif-
ferent properties, as followed by Subsection 2.5.2 which introduces the operators
used in temporal logic. Subsection 2.5.3 shows how to express system properties
in the form of temporal logic.
2.5.1 Temporal Properties
Reactive and concurrent systems are usually very complex in structure, making
their design and analysis processes very difficult to achieve. A mistake in the
design can easily in occur in such difficult system processes. Any mistake can
lead to unwanted properties, such as deadlock, occurring. Safety, liveness, and
fairness are the major properties of concurrent and reactive systems that require
specification and verification [26, 27, 28].
These properties can be described as follows:
Safety: The safety property requires that the system will not have anything
bad happening while it is running. Mutual exclusion, freedom from deadlock and
partial correctness are examples of this property. The following statements are
examples of safety properties: ‘the reactor temperature will never reach 150oC,’
‘the car will never start as long as the key is not in the ignition position.’ Again,
the property assures that nothing bad will happen.
Liveness: The liveness property assures that something good will eventually
happen. This property is important to ensure that something ‘good’ must hap-
pen in the future. Liveness properties are important where there are any infinite
behaviours of the systems. Examples of the liveness property are total correct-
ness, guaranteed accessibility and responsiveness. The following statements are
examples of liveness properties: ‘the traffic light will turn green,’ ‘the message will
be delivered eventually,’ ‘the program will terminate.’
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Fairness: The fairness property ensures that a request must be granted. This
property helps to serve services via a fair strategy. The advantage of defining
fairness properties is to avoid reaching properties without specifying the fairness
properties. Fairness constraints are imposed to avoid forcing the system to perform
unrealistic computations. These constraints are unconditional fairness, strong fair-
ness and weak fairness. Unconditional fairness imposes the condition that every
process can be executed infinitely often; the strong fairness property states that
every process that is enabled infinitely often gets to be executed infinitely often;
and the weak fairness property ensures that every process that is continuously en-
abled from a certain point in time can be executed infinitely often. It is important
to understand that fairness is a requirement of demonstrating liveness [5, 29]. The
different types of fairness property describe liveness properties.
2.5.2 Temporal Operators
There are two types of operators in temporal logic. The first are the ordinary
logical operators (∧,∨,¬,⇒, ⇐⇒ ) which have their usual meanings, whilst the
second are temporal operators which are used in temporal logic, such as LTL
(Linear-Time Temporal Logic) and CTL (Computational Tree Logic). Temporal
logic takes into consideration the necessity and the possibility concepts. If β is a
formula, then Fβ is a temporal logic formula that asserts that β is possibly true,
and Gβ is a temporal logic formula that asserts that β is necessarily true. Table
2.4 summarizes some of the temporal logic operators’ meanings:
Table 2.4: Temporal logic operators.
Operator Meaning
Fα α will be true at some time in the future.
Gα α will always be true in the future.
αUβ α will always be true until β becomes true.
Xα α will be true next.
Eα Exists: there exists at least one path starting from the
current state where α holds.
Aα All: α has to hold on all paths starting from the current
state.
2.5.3 Properties Expressed in Temporal Logic
This section will express some of the system properties mentioned earlier in sub-
section 2.5.1 using temporal logic [12].
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Safety properties:
1. Mutual exclusion:
No two processes can access the same resource simultaneously. For example,
if two processes α and β are running asynchronously (only one of them take
a step at any given moment) and the order of execution is undetermined.
Mutual exclusion is described in temporal logic as follows:
G¬((α = R) ∧ (β = R))
where α = R means that the process α uses the resource R.
2. Freedom from deadlock:
At least one process is allowed to progress at any time. This can be written
formally as:
G(enabled1 ∨ . . . ∨ enabledk)
where enabled is true if process i has an action that can be executed (for
1 ≤ i ≤ k)
3. Partial correctness:
After the program starts, if α is satisfied, then β will be satisfied if the
program reaches a successful state γ.
α⇒ G(γ ⇒ β)
Liveness Properties:
1. Guaranteed accessibility:
A process that is in a particular state will eventually go to the next state.
For example, the computations that execute both process α and process γ
infinitely often will hold:
G((α = i)⇒ F (α = (i+ 1)) ∧G((β = i)⇒ F (β = (i+ 1))
where the processes α and β can be in state 1 (i.e., α = i ) then move to the
next state, state i+ 1.
2. Responsiveness:
A request will eventually be granted upon request. This property can be
described as:
G(α⇒ Fβ)
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where α is a request and β means granted.
3. Total correctness:
After the start of the program, if α is satisfied, then the program terminates
in a state γ where β is satisfied.
α⇒ F (γ ∧ β)
Fairness properties:
1. Strong fairness:
A process which is enabled infinitely often will be executed infinitely often:∧
1≤i≤k
(GF enabledi ⇒ GFexecutedi)
This is interpreted as an event that becomes enabled infinitely often (but
may become disabled) must be executed infinitely often.
2. Weak fairness:
Any process that is enabled almost everywhere is executed infinitely often,
such that: ∧
1≤i≤k
(FG enabledi ⇒ GFexecutedi)
This is interpreted as a constantly enabled event must occur infinitely often.
3. Unconditional fairness:
Every process is executed infinitely often, such that:∧
1≤i≤k
(FG enabledi)
This is interpreted as being that the process can be executed at any time.
2.6 Model Checking
In critical systems, it is a matter of great importance to ensure correctness of both
software and hardware as errors or failures have the potential to result in large
financial losses and can lead to fatal consequences, especially in safety-critical sys-
tems [30, 31]. Verification techniques’ formal methods have became of considerable
interest when building high assurance systems and in avoiding failures in critical
system. The most successful technique used by both the industry and in research
is model checking.
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Model checking is an automatic verification method for finite state concurrent
systems to check if a system model M or a protocol satisfies its formal specifica-
tions as written in logic as temporal logic [30]. The model represents all possible
behaviours of the system [5, 12]. The properties of the system are written as
formulae. A property formula φ is checked by exploring all possible system execu-
tions in the state space of the model to demonstrate whether the correctness of the
system is satisfied by the model. This is represented as M |= φ [32]. An advant-
age of model checking is that it is fully automatic and does not require particular
expertise in mathematics to run or interpret. The automatic tool which achieves
this job is called the model checker. Another advantage of model checking is that
if a property is not satisfied (i.e., an error is found), a counterexample is given
showing the reason for the problem and the state of the system which led to this
error [31, 12].
In software engineering, the costs of testing software can range from 30% to
50% of the total cost of the software development [5]. Test generation and test
execution can be automated in some areas, but the comparison is usually carried
out by human beings. Correctness is determined by making the software travel
across a set of execution paths, but ensuring the exhaustive testing of all paths is
not possible, which is a big disadvantage in cases where only software testing is
carried out. This means that testing can never be complete. On the other hand,
in model checking, correctness is checked by an exhaustive exploration of the state
space of the model, which makes model checking the rigorous method of choice
for use with concurrent and critical systems. State explosion is considered to be
the main disadvantage of model checking; when the system has a large number of
interacting components or when the system data structure contains a large number
of differing values, state explosion can occur because of the huge number of states
the system can potentially adopt. The size of the system becomes a problem when
it grows exponentially as a result of an increase in the number of state variables.
For example, in a system which is composed of n processes and each process has
k states, the possible number of states by the asynchronous composition of these
processes can be defined by mk.
For the past 30 years, researchers have tried to solve the state explosion prob-
lem so as to be able to provide better model checking approaches. Two main
solutions to avoid the state explosion problem are used: the first is to reduce the
size of the state space to be searched, and this is generally accomplished using
abstraction; the second, which was first introduced in 1987 by Ken McMillan, is
to use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to represent the state space [33]. The
latter solution made it possible to verify systems that have more than 1020 states
[34]. Researchers concentrated on further refinements to BDD-based techniques
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subsequent to this accomplishment, and in which the number of states can be
more than 10120 [35]. The well-known model checker NuSMV is based on these
ideas.
This allowed model checking to be successfully used in verifying larger systems
than could previously have been attempted, and to successfully detect otherwise
highly obscure errors in communication protocols and hardware controllers [31].
2.6.1 Stages of Model Checking
The phases of model checking are as follows:
• Modelling: In this phase, through the use of the formal description language
of the model checker, the design is converted into an acceptable form by the
tool, where this form is called the model.
• Specification: In this stage, the design properties are written.
• Verification: This step includes verifying the specifications against the design
to determine whether the specifications are valid or otherwise. In this stage,
an exhaustive search of the model state space is carried out using the model
checker, which determines if the specification has satisfied or otherwise. If
the specification is not satisfied, a counterexample is instead given by the
model checker.
2.6.2 Transactions and Temporal Logic
It is clear that temporal logic is particularly powerful when dealing with the reas-
oning adopted in concurrent systems. We can use temporal logic to conduct auto-
matic proofs of this kind of systems to avoid the errors often inherent to manual
mathematics proofs. To this end, there are various powerful model checkers avail-
able such as NuSMV [36] and SPIN [37], but we need to select which temporal
logic is supported by these model checkers. CTL and LTL are supported in these
model checkers and can be used in this case.
Serializability is considered to be a safety property [38]. Temporal logic can
be used to specify other properties of the histories of an unlimited number of
transactions, such as starvation. In starvation, some transactions are not served
for an indefinite period of time while the system is executing [13]. In [39, 40],
starvation is considered a liveness property. The most common problems that face
database transaction schedulers are deadlock and starvation [13]. Using temporal
logic, deadlock-freedom (which is considered as a safety property) can be achieved
if required, especially in transactions that have the potential to iterate an unlimited
number of times.
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2.7 Thesis Structure
In the following chapter, the literature review and research methodology will be
presented. In Chapter 4, LTL is used to specify a model of the execution of an
unbounded number of concurrent transactions over time in order to demonstrate
serializability. This chapter benefits from recent research in specifying the concur-
rent modification of data on routers in a network as a transactional model.
Chapter 5 specifies the basic synchronous network flooding algorithm, for any
fixed size of network, in Linear Temporal Logic. A specification of the termination
problem is formulated and used to compare different topologies in terms of earlier
termination. A worked example is given for one topology which results in an
earlier termination than another, and for which we perform a formal verification
using the NuSMV model checker.
In Chapter 6, a formal model of bounded asynchronous network flooding is
given by extending the ideas expressed in Chapter 5 with regards to synchronous
flooding to allow a sent message to either be received instantaneously, or enter a
transit phase prior to being received, in a non-deterministic manner. A general-
ization of the ‘rounds’ in synchronous flooding is made for the asynchronous case
is used as a unit of time in order to provide a measure of time for the termination
of a run of an asynchronous system in terms of the number of rounds taken. The
model is encoded into temporal logic and a proof obligation is given for comparing
the termination times of asynchronous and synchronous systems. We give further
related work in the related chapters.
Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the thesis. Figure 2.6 provides a summary
of the remaining chapters in this thesis. The stars next to the chapters indicate
that they include the contributions made by this thesis.
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Figure 2.6: Thesis Chapters
Chapter 3
Literature Review and Research
Methodology
3.1 Introduction
With the exponential increase of capabilities of current technology, the need to
provide reliable systems has increased in parallel. The safety property (nothing
bad ever happens) and liveness property (something good will eventually happen)
specifications and verifications for reactive systems have increased to avoid mal-
functioning systems and losses of various types. Coordinating the work of the
different tasks and components of these systems is important to ensure a consist-
ently running system.
The reliance on database transactions has increased markedly due to the rapid
increase in the technology and number of users with access to this technology.
Conventional database concurrency methods model finite transaction schedules
[12, 14, 41]. The representation of histories of an unlimited number of transac-
tions, as a model, can be achieved using temporal logic. Distributed network
systems consist of certain properties, and their algorithms should be specified to
maintain these properties. Conventional testing methods cannot physically cover
all the potential possibilities that might arise when designing the systems, espe-
cially where these systems consist of multiple components that interact with each
other in a certain manner. Providing rigorous methods of specifying and verify-
ing these systems to eliminate errors using mathematical proofs is difficult as it
requires people with mathematical expertise to maintain such proofs. Even with
using mathematical proofs, simple human error means that accomplishing such
proofs is, in any case, impossible. An advantage of using temporal logic is that
there is no need for special expertise to ensure rigorous verification. Another ad-
vantage is the exhaustive checks that can be performed by existing model checkers,
34
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such as NuSMV [36] and Spin [37].
3.2 Literature Review
Formal methods, in general, are considered to be powerful when being used to build
critical systems in order to make sure that they are robust and secure. Temporal
logic in particular has been used in specifying both hardware and software systems.
Due to the availability of powerful model checker tools, temporal logic can be used
to specify required properties of systems and to subsequently verify them.
Temporal logic has been, is currently is, used in specifying and verifying the
various properties of reactive systems. The ability to use temporal logic and model
checking to rigorously reason about the specifications properties in reactive sys-
tems is the major advantage which led to their use in Human Computer Interaction
(HCI) in the computer technology [42]. As user interfaces are considered reactive
systems as they interact with their environment, in [43, 44], temporal logic was
used to formally specify and verify software user interfaces to minimize the possib-
ility of introducing bugs in software as the possibility increases with the growth of
the software user interface, which becomes harder to test for the existence of such
bugs. In some fields, such as in Air Traffic Control (ATC), testing can be very
expensive and indeed determining the number of test cases that are sufficient to
ensure an exhaustive analysis can be very difficult [42]. Using temporal logic and
model checking in these types of scenarios can decrease the the number of tests
needed, as well as giving the ability to test the various possible system states [42].
Electronic systems used on artificial satellites and aircraft are called avionics
which is a term coming from ‘aviation electronics’. These systems control many
different operations and functions of the devices which they are used in. The
operation of this type of systems has to maintain certain properties at all times.
Temporal logic has been used in avionics software which is concerned with safety
and reliability properties in avionics [45]. Temporal logic is also used in robotics
so that properties and the system model are correct. In health-care, temporal
logic has been used due to the high risk to any error that can be caused by a bug
in a device or a program [45]. Temporal logic has been used in traffic control [46].
To avoid congestion in traffic control, some statements need to be implemented.
An example of these statements is a statement like ’always avoid traffic’ can be
implemented using temporal logic. Testing is not enough in these kinds of systems
as testing only shows presence of bugs not their absence.
Concurrency is a topic that has been considered for a number of decades, and
indeed has seen increased interest in accordance with the rise in new mobile tech-
nologies. The data accessed by any transaction should qualify and meet certain
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conditions upon completion of the transaction (when the transaction commits).
Different algorithms are used in this field to accomplish this task. In [12], a rep-
resentation of how multi-step transactions can access data items infinitely many
times is given.
In [47], the concurrency control between mobile transactions and update trans-
actions was studied and a protocol proposed to ensure the serializability of sched-
ules. Its main goal was to ensure data consistency and maximize data currency for
mobile transactions. An extensive simulation was undertaken and its performance
compared with the results of other methods. In [48], a timestamp-based concur-
rency control protocol was used to maintain the data consistency of broadcast
transactions. This research also made an attempt to reduce the abort rate to min-
imize concurrency control. The results of associated simulation were compared
to another protocol to demonstrate the efficiency of protocol proposed therein.
Another protocol was developed in [49] for broadcast transactions that allowed
hopeless transactions to be discarded. The main goal was to decrease transaction
restart rates and increase system throughput, as compared with other protocols,
through the simulation results. All of these protocols relied on the use simulations
for their protocols, which could potentially contain undiscovered errors. By con-
trast, we will use model checking, which explores all possible system states in a
brute-force manner.
Research into modelling infinite histories was initially reported in [50], which
covered transactions that repeated infinitely often. In [12], modelling infinite his-
tories of multistep transactions was studied for mobile transactions. This research
used linear temporal logic (LTL) in specifying the properties of these transactions.
Partial-ordered temporal logic (POTL) was used to specify concurrent database
transactions in [51], whilst the specification of this type of transaction was achieved
using quantified-propositional temporal logic (QPTL) in [52]; in [53], LTL was
used. A monadic fragment of first-order temporal logic was used to specify the
concurrent transactions in [54]. All of these logics are of exponential space com-
plexity and, with the exception of LTL, are at worst undecidable. An advantage
of LTL is the ability of available model checkers to use it; a disadvantage of these
logics, again with the exception of LTL, is that it is impractical to demonstrate
even basic serializability [12].
Distributed network routing algorithms deal with directing and redirecting
messages between the different network routers and end points [17]. The router’s
job is to send the message to one of it’s neighbours with which it has a connection in
order to deliver the message to its destination [17]. A fundamental algorithm which
can also be also be used for routing is the flooding algorithm [18]. Flooding forms
the basis of many important distributed processes, for example, the construction
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of BFS trees which are used in the work on distributed Leader Election [19]. The
flooding algorithm utilizes every available path in the network [20]. In flooding,
a message is sent from one node to all of its neighbours. Those neighbours which
receives a message will forward the message to all of its neighbours except the
one(s) from which it was originally received [21, 20, 18, 22].
Dealing with timing in processes events is very important to determine the
sequence of events timing. When dealing with events within a process, the local
clock can be used to determine the timing of different events. The difficulty
comes when dealing with distributed processes, where time synchronization is
very difficult. Processes in distributed systems communicate with each other using
messages. the event of sending a message from one process to another leads to
an event of a message being delivered at the recipient process. An event of a
message being received happens only after an event of sending a message originally
happened at the sender. If we have two processes, a and b, and process a sends a
message to process b, we can say that if process b receives a message from process
a, then process a must have sent the message to process b before process b received
it.
To solve the problem of time synchronization in distributed systems, in 1978,
a computing scientist, Leslie Lamport, introduced what is called logical clocks
to synchronize processes in distributed systems [55]. These clocks can be used
to record causality which means that some events in a distributed system must
always occur before other events, which means that the event that happened
before caused the event that happened after to occur. The ‘happens-before’ logical
relationship among pairs of events is denoted by →. We can represent a message
m sent from process a to process b as: send(m) → receive(m) According to
Lamport’s solution, a timestamp is associated with every event that happens in
every process across the entire distributed system. This is achieved by having a
local clock (or counter) in each process and associating a timestamp with every
event in that process. If we have two processes Pi and Pj with local clocks Ci and
Cj, respectively, and Pi sends a message to Pj where a is the send event and b is
the received event, then Ci(a) < Cj(b). This is achieved by setting Cj(b) to the
following: Cj(b) = max(Ci(a) + 1, Cj(b)).
Expanders are a very important class of graphs (having the property of being
simultaneously sparse and well connected) that have applications in various areas
of computer science and mathematics; for instance, in the design and analysis
of communication networks, cryptography, error-correcting codes, pseudorandom-
ness, complexity, coding theory, metric embeddings, etc. (for details, see this well-
known survey [56]). For example, in the context of distributed computer networks
they have been used for building censorship-resistant networks [57, 58], fault toler-
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ant networks [59], efficient (Byzantine) agreement and leader election algorithms
[60, 61, 62, 63], analysing information spreading, etc. [64]. Thus, even the efficient
construction (in static or dynamic fault-tolerant settings) of expander networks is
an important line of research [65, 66, 67, 68, 69].
Distributed systems can be specified as a combination of the specifications used
for constituent components by using well-studied process calculi approaches such
as CSP [1], CCS [2], the pi-calculus [70], the Ambient Calculus [71] and I/O auto-
mata [72]. These methods are useful when components have significant internal
actions/states that affect external actions but which need to be abstracted away to
demonstrate the properties of their external behaviour. In this thesis, our interest
is in the network flooding algorithm where individual components, in this case
physical nodes in a network, have a minimal number of internal states. The global
properties that must be demonstrated derive their complexity from the topology
of the associated network graph. It may be difficult to achieve a desirable global
topology as some form of composition of components, and may necessitate further
proofs to show that the topology has indeed been achieved. Here, we choose a
more direct logic-based approach, specifying the overall system - algorithm and
network topology - as a set of temporal logic constraints in order to demonstrate
the required properties. This has the added benefit that a different network to-
pology can, if required, be easily specified by changing a single constraint, rather
than many components, in order to achieve the same effect.
3.3 Motivation
One of the most difficult challenges for software engineering is to manage the
complexity of the algorithms and software found in concurrent systems. Network
systems have come to prominence in many aspects of modern life, and there-
fore software engineering techniques for treating concurrency in such systems has
gained in importance. Considerable effort was expended in previous research in the
attempt to increase performance in concurrent system environments and network
algorithms. The specification of network algorithms and their safety and liveness
properties through the use of formal methods is the ultimate aim of the research
presented in this thesis. Temporal logic has proved to be a successful technique
when used in formal methods, and which has practical application due to the
availability of powerful model checking tools such as the NuSMV model checker.
We will investigate the specification and verification of network algorithms using
temporal logic and model checking. In the first part of this thesis, we will demon-
strate the safety property with regards to the data consistency or serializability of
a model describing the execution of an unbounded number of concurrent transac-
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tions over time which use temporal logic. The particular interest here is that these
concurrent transactions could represent software schedulers for an unknown num-
bers of transactions being executed across a network. The second part focusses on
specifying and verifying the liveness properties of networked flooding algorithms.
3.4 Research Methodology
The objective of this research is the specification and verification of network al-
gorithms using linear temporal logic. The main reason for using linear temporal
logic is due to the fact that this method can be extended in order to verify the
histories of an unlimited number of transactions. In addition to this, another ad-
ded benefit is that a different network topology can be easily specified by changing
a single constraint, rather than many components, in order to achieve the same
effect. With the developments of model checkers, NuSMV is powerful tool when
dealing with a large number of states and in verifying real-world systems [73]. In
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), time is modelled by representing it as a path where
the future is determined. It is used in specifying general reactive and concurrent
systems [74, 75].
In this research, we will model the network algorithm as finite state transition
systems, where the specification is expressed in LTL. Afterwards, automatically
the state space of the state transition system is going to be explored to verify if
the protocol or algorithm satisfies the desired specifications. The model checking
is guaranteed to terminate due to the finite nature of the model. Considering
the power of the model checker and the important element that if any of the
specifications do not hold that a counterexample is given [36]. In this thesis, the
specifications and verification of network algorithms will be modelled as a finite
state machine in NuSMV input language. The protocol transactions and the
network algorithm processes are created based on the behaviour of the protocol or
the algorithm over time. The model will be identified by a set of desired properties
to ensure that the NuSMV model matches these properties, which will be expressed
in LTL. Finally, if the specification of the desired property satisfies all system
behaviours, the model checker will produce TRUE; otherwise, a counterexample
will be given by the NuSMV model checker, representing an error source.
Chapter 4
Network Routing Protocols
4.1 Introduction
Current internet routing protocols differ according to the algorithms used. This
chapter focusses on systems of routers where the the routers are accessed by con-
current transactions. The transactions access and update the routers’ data; it
is vital that this data remains consistent. Because of the high concurrency of
such systems, they are considered system critical, where their failure can lead to
considerable losses. Since different transactions attempt to access the routers at
the same time, it becomes difficult to deal with them due to the importance of
maintaining the integrity of the data being accessed. A protocol is presented in
this chapter that aims to achieve the consistency condition for concurrent trans-
actions, namely serializability. This protocol is checked for cycles in the conflict
graph in terms of the concurrent transactions accessing the data on routers [76].
Due to the availability of powerful model checking tools, temporal logic is used
to specify and verify this protocol. Since routers are naturally ordered in some
given manner, the transactions access them in an ordered manner. A transaction
can access a set of routers, and indeed can skip routers in the set. The routers
so skipped represent ‘gaps’ in the set of routers accessed. By knowing the size
of such gaps in the different transactions, an upper bound can be placed on the
number of transactions that need to be considered and a serializability condition
can be formulated which can then be verified by the model checker.
In the next section, we will present a review of relevant previous work. In
section 4.2, we will discuss concurrent transactions and serializability, in addi-
tion to discussing ‘gap theory’, which underlies our work. In section 4.3, we will
describe the methodology involved in using temporal logic. Section 4.4 presents
the transactional model used in this chapter and gives a detailed description of
how gap theory is used. Section 4.5 describes the protocol. In section 4.6, we
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formally define LTL and in Section 4.7 we specify the protocol in LTL. The LTL
specification is coded into NuSMV in Section 4.8 and verifications are made using
the NuSMV model checker, and the subsequent results reported. The last section
gives a number of concluding remarks regarding the sections mentioned above.
4.2 Motivation
s2This chapter focusses on specifying and verifying a protocol for an unlimited
number of multi-step transactions accessing a finite set of routers with different
properties using temporal logic and a model checker. Serializability in concurrent
systems is considered a particularly challenging topic in the field of computer
systems. Due to the strict properties of critical computer-based systems and, in
recent years, the increased number of mobile transactions, our work introduces a
routing protocol that can efficiently detect any breach of serializability should the
routers be accessed by multi-step transactions with gaps. By calculating the sizes
of the gaps in the different transactions, a cycle can be easily detected. This is
because there will be no need to check all the different-sized cycles possible. Our
work benefits from previous research which defined gaps and introduced a theorem
to calculate gap size [77]. This chapter applies this theorem, as introduced in [77],
to routing systems. We model the protocol in temporal logic (LTL) and use the
NuSMV model checker to prove or indeed that the models satisfy the serializability
property.
4.3 Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to specify the correctness, in terms of the serializ-
ability, of concurrent transactions executing on routers’ data, using specifications
written in LTL. The purpose of using temporal logic, such as LTL, is that the
method can verify an unlimited number of transaction schedules. The significance
of temporal logic in computer science is clear, especially in the specification and
verification of critical computer-based systems. The availability of model check-
ers, such as NuSMV, that can be used to model temporal logic properties, and
their capability to dealing with a large number of states and verifying real-world
systems, allow us to verify the correctness of the proposed protocol. To gain a
fully automated verification, the NuSMV model checker will be used to verify
the protocol properties specified in temporal logic. The protocol presented will
be modelled in terms of finite state transition systems whose specifications are
expressed in LTL. The next step will be to explore the state space of the state
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transition system, where it is possible to automatically check if the protocol sat-
isfies its specifications, or otherwise. Using LTL, it is possible to express the
properties that must be fulfilled by the system. The model checker will be used
in the final stage, where it will return a“true” result if the specifications of the
required properties have indeed been satisfied; a counterexample is given by the
model checker to indicate any potential source of error.
4.4 Concurrent Transactions and Serializability
A transaction is a sequence of operations performed on one or more databases
which is representative of a single real-world transition. This section introduces
some of the basics of concurrent data transactions and their histories. In partiuc-
ular, we will be concerned here with an unlimited number of transactions creating
an unlimited number of histories. However, the number of live transactions at any
given point in time will clearly be limited to some finite integer, n.
4.4.1 Concurrent Transactions and Histories
Definition 4.4.1 A multi-step transaction [10] Ti is formed of a sequence of read
and write steps on data items from a totally ordered set of data items Di =
{x1, x2, . . . , xm}, where every read step ri(x) comes before its corresponding write
step wi(x), so that
Ti = ri(x1)wi(x1)...ri(xm)wi(xm).
We assume an infinite set of such transactions, T = {Ti : i ∈ N1}, where N1 is
the set of positive integers over all time.
A schedule, or history, is the sequence of all the steps of the transactions in T
h = . . . , sj, . . . , sj′ , . . . ,
such that each step s of a transaction Ti occurs at most once in h, and any step s
′
that comes before s in Ti comes before s in h. The order of the steps in h is denoted
<h, so that if a step sj occurs before a step (of a possibly different transaction) sj′
in h, we have the condition that sj <h sj′.
A history is serial if all the operations of transaction appear together in h, i.e.,
for all steps sj, sj′, sj′′ in h and i ∈ N1, if sj <h sj′′ <h sj′ and sj and sj′ are
steps of Ti, then sj′′ is also a step of Ti.
Given a history h, the conflict graph G(h) of h is a directed graph whose nodes
are equal to the set of transactions T = {Ti : i ∈ N1}, and, for all i, j ∈ N1, there
is an edge from node Ti to node Tj iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
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(i) a write step in Ti occurs in h before a read step of Tj to the same data item;
(ii) a read step in Ti occurs in h before a write step of Tj to the same data item;
(iii) a write step in Ti occurs in h before a write step of Tj to the same data item.
Two different transactions are said to be conflicting if they require access to a
shared data item and at least one of their operations is a write operation (on
the shared data item). This conflict can leave the database in an inconsistent
state when transactions are running concurrently. To avoid a resulting inconsist-
ent database, some form of scheduling the concurrent transactions is needed. A
history h is said to be serializable if it is equivalent to some serial schedule of the
transactions (see [14]). In this case, the results of executing the transactions yields
the same result as if they were executed in a serial order. Serializable histories
allow greater concurrency than serial histories, leading to higher throughput. It
is well known that in the case of finitely many transactions a history h is serial-
izable iff its conflict graph has no cycles. In [12], Theorem 2.4 shows that in the
case of infinitely many transactions accessing a finite number of data items,the
serializability of their history h also corresponds to acyclicity in the conflict graph
G(h).
4.4.2 Transactions Accessing Data in the Same Order
Serializability of histories can be proved for finitely many transactions in polyno-
mial time [12, 13, 14, 15] by showing that there are no cycles of the transactions
in the conflict graphs. The problem of searching for cycles in conflict graphs
when there is an unlimited number of transactions is that of deciding which finite
number of transactions might form a cycle, as there are infinitely many possible
choices. This problem was addressed in [12], where it was found that if there is a
fixed global total order <D on the finite set of all data items {x1, . . . , xm},
x1 <D . . . <D xm,
accessed by the infinitely many transactions, and transactions are only allowed
to access contiguous data items that respect this order, then the conflict graph
G(h) of an infinite history h has a cycle if, and only if, it has a cycle of length 2
(Theorem 3.7 of [12]). So, if transactions are all of the form:
Ti = ri(xi1)wi(xi1)ri(xi1+1)wi(xi1+1) . . . ri(ximi−1)wi(ximi−1)ri(ximi )wi(ximi )
a history has a cycle iff there is a cycle of length 2, i.e., we only need to consider
the two transactions and two data items that cause the conflict. This somewhat
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restrictive condition on data access was relaxed in the case of infinitely many
transactions generated by a fixed finite number n of transactions iterating infinitely
many times in[77], so as to require that the order of access by transactions respects
the global order but that there could be ‘gaps’ in the sequence of data items
accessed. So, for example, if we have the globally ordered data items
x1 <D x2 <D x3 <D x4,
, a transaction could, for example, access x2 then x4 (here there is a gap as x3 is
not accessed - but this is allowed). However, a transaction could not access, for
example, x3 and then x2 as the global order of access <D would not be respected.
The bound in [77] on the length of cycles in the conflict graphs when there are gaps
in the succession of data items being accessed by transactions is given below. We
will use the notation in Definition 2.5 of [77], where if a set of data items D′ ⊆ D
is denoted by {xa, . . . , xb}, which will mean that xa <D . . . <D xb. Firstly, we
define the ‘gap’ in the data items accessed by a transaction.
Definition 4.4.2 Assume that the transaction Ti accesses a set of data items
Di ⊆ D such that
Di = {xa, . . . , xc}
where xa <D . . . <D xc. Then, the gap G
i of the set Di can be calculated as
follows:
Gi = (c− a+ 1)− (|Di|) (4.1)
where (c − a + 1) is the number of elements in the sequence xa . . . xc, and |Di| is
the cardinality of the set Di [77].
Secondly, the maximum gap G of k (≤ n) transactions is defined as follows:
Definition 4.4.3 Let {Ti : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a set of transactions that iterates an
unlimited number of times to constitute infinitely many transactions T = {Ti : i ∈
N}, and let each Ti ∈ T access a set of data items Di. At any given point in time
there exist k transactions, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that
k⋃
i=1
Di = {xa, xa+1, . . . , xu}
where xa <D . . . <D xa + 1 . . . <D xu. The maximum gap G can then be calculated
as follows:
G =
0, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,Gi = 0u− a− 1, ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,Gi 6= 0. (4.2)
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The main result is Theorem 3.4 in [77], which states the following:
Theorem 4.4.4 Assume D to be an irreflexively totally ordered set of data items
such that
D = {x1, x2, . . . , xn−1, xn}
which is accessed by a set of transactions T generated by n transactions iterating
an unlimited number of times, as in Definition 4.4.3, and that access the set D
as per Definition 4.4.3. Assume we have a maximum gap G = n − 2 in the set
D denoted by Gn−2 and that there is a cycle in the corresponding conflict graph
G(h). There then exists a cycle of length n, denoted by Cn, in the corresponding
conflict graph G(h).
The following example will explain how we use these definitions and theorems.
Assume that we have five transactions, T1, . . . , T5, accessing the set of data items
D = {x1, x2, . . . , x8}, as in Definition 2.5 of [77], as follows:
D1 = {x2, x3} D2 = {x3, x4},
D3 = {x3, x6} D4 = {x3, x5},
D5 = {x4, x5}.
First we calculate the gap Gi using equation 4.1 in Definition 4.4.2 as follows:
G1 = 3− 2− 2 + 1 = 0, G2 = 4− 3− 2 + 1 = 0,
G3 = 6− 3− 2 + 1 = 2, G4 = 5− 3− 2 + 1 = 1,
G5 = 5− 4− 2 + 1 = 0.
After finding the gaps, we find the maximum gap. The maximum gap is G = 3
(G3). Hence, by Theorem 4.4.4, the maximum cycle will be of length 5 (C5).
Building a precedence graph for the history h of all transactions T1, . . . , T5 will
determine if we have a cycle of length 5 (C5). This method will be used in specify-
ing and verifying the serializability of a routing protocol, where we will be able
to detect a cycle in an efficient manner. Theorem 4.4.4 (Theorem 3.4 in [77]) can
be used in many applications, as discussed in [77]. One of the more important
applications discussed in [77] is that of booking a flight e-ticket through different
agencies. It is clear that destinations are naturally ordered. Booking a ticket from
any place to another will present different options, one of which is where a person
can book a direct ticket, meaning that there will be no transit and thus creating a
gap. Another option is when a ticket is booked that has multi-stop destinations.
In the second situation, there could also be gaps. In the case where the ticket con-
tains all the stops on the path from departure to destination, there is no gap. In
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the following section, we will bear this example in mind when considering routing
protocols.
4.5 Description of the Protocol
An important class of routing protocols is that of administrative protocols, which
we intend to model herein. In our protocol, we will assume that we have different
routers connecting different systems, where the packets are passed through some,
or all, of them from the sending node to the receiving node. The router’s job is to
create a path where the packet will travel from source to destination. The path
consists of the different routers it passes through until it reaches its destination.
The routers are naturally ordered in some manner, where they are presented as
a set D. Each router has its own information table. We denote each router
by ri ∈ D. A packet can travel through two or more routers according to the
path it is set to travel through. A packet path can be set where the packet can
reach the destination by going from the first and closest router (source) to the
router which is closest to the destination (destination) without going through
any other routers. Another scenario is when the path through which a packet
must travel to reach its destination consists of more than two routers. The router
table needs to be updated, through which data is kept consistent. The different
concurrent transactions associated with sending data across a network require this
concurrency where a transaction can check (read) the router or update (write on)
the router. A scheduler needs to be used to avoid conflicting transactions from
stopping the network or corrupting data while sending it across the network. The
scheduler in the proposed protocol needs to maintain serializability. The main
two steps in the transactions that we will be using in our protocol are the read
step and the write step, where accessing and updating the associated data occurs
accordingly.
It is clear that the routers are naturally ordered in some manner. Therefore,
creating a path from router A to router F can include many choices in terms of
the other routers included in the path. In our model, we assume that there can
be either a direct or multi-stop path between two given routers. To represent
this scenario, we assume that we have the set routers D, which here we will call
destinations, where |D| = k are ordered as per Figure 4.1. The set D contains
all destinations starting from location (router) A to end at location F . The next
location from location i is xi, such that xi ∈ D, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The
first option in creating a path is that the path runs directly from A to F without
passing through any other destinations. We call this a direct path without stop.
Transaction T1 , which represents this case, accesses the set D1 = {A,F}. The
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gap for the set D1 is G
1 = k − 2. This path is illustrated as edge 1 in Figure
4.2. The second choice is to have a path from A to B then from B to F , which
is represented by edges 2 and 3 in Figure 4.2. A third choice might be to select
a path from A to B, then from B to C, and finally from C to F . A fourth path
which can be selected might be by going from A to B to C to D to E, and then
finally from E to F ; this path contains all the stops from the initial point A to
the final point F . Here we represent the read step of the transaction as accessing
the destination (router), whilst the write step represents the modification on this
router. The set D represents the ordered routers as defined in Definition 2.5 of
[77]. The number of ignored destinations from the start to the end destination is
represented by the gap, as given in Definition 4.4.2. The maximum gap illustrates
the number of destinations that not accessed in the path where there is any avail-
able path from A to F .
•A −→ •B 99K •i xi−→ • 99K •F
Figure 4.1: Representation of the set of ordered routers.
•A 2 //
1
,,•B //
4
33•C // •i xi // • // •F
Figure 4.2: Representation of the set of ordered routers with gaps.
4.6 Temporal Logic
Temporal logic is used to provide reasoning about a changing world [24], where
the formula truth values may vary over time [12]. Facts about past, present,
and future states can be expressed in the formulae of temporal logic. The use
of temporal logic for formal specification and verification of computer systems
was introduced by Amir Pnueli [78]. Temporal logic has been broadly used in
the representation of temporal information because the concept of time is built
into it. Verification of concurrent and reactive systems makes extensive use of
temporal logic [23]. E-commerce and traffic control systems are examples of such
systems where, at the same time, an error in this type of system is considered fatal.
Model checkers for different types of temporal logic have been developed with the
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ability to verify real-world systems in only a short period of time given that these
systems generally contain a very large number of states. Temporal logic is helpful
in the specification of concurrent systems by describing the event ordering over
time. With the exponential growth of technologies and concurrent systems, these
systems have become more complicated and an understanding of their interactions
more important. This means that the specification and verification of some of their
properties are essential [25, 26]. In a paper called “What good is temporal logic?”,
which is considered to be of particular significance in the field, Leslie Lamport
emphasized that the main function of temporal logic lies in modelling concurrent
systems [79]. We will use Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) in the specification and
verification of our routing protocol.
4.6.1 Syntax of LTL
The alphabet of LTL consists of a set of propositional symbols pi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
which in our use will include special read/write step propositional symbols ri(xj), wi(xj),
with i ≥ 1 and j ≥ 1, booleans ¬,∨,∧,>,⊥, and temporal operators X, F, O, G,
U. Formulae in LTL are those generated by:
φ ::= pi|ri(xj)|wi(xj)|¬φ|φ1 ∨ φ2|φ1 ∧ φ2|Xφ|Fφ|Oφ|Gφ|φ1Uφ2
The symbols> and⊥ will also be used to denote true and false values, respectively.
The symbols ⇒ and ⇔ have their usual logical meanings.
4.6.2 Semantics of LTL
Linear Temporal Logic is interpreted over a sequence of states s0, . . . , sa, . . . (a ∈
N). An interpretation of LTL, I(sa), at a given state sa assigns truth values pIs(a)i ,
ri(xj)
I(sa) and wi(xj)
I(sa)(∈ {⊥,>}) to the propositional symbols pi, ri(xj) and
wi(xj), respectively. A (Kripke) structure M , as defined in [5], is a sequence of
interpretations I(s0), . . . , I(sa), . . . for the sequence of states. The semantics of
an LTL formula φ is given by a truth relationship M, sa |= φ, which means that
φ holds at state sa in the structure M . The relation |= is defined inductively as
follows:
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M, sa |= pi iff pI(sa)i = >
M, sa |= ri(xj) iff ri(xj)I(sa) = >
M, sa |= wi(xj) iff wi(xj)I(sa) = >
M, sa |= ¬φ iff M, sa 6|= φ
M, sa |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff M, sa |= φ1 or M, sa |= φ2
M, sa |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M, sa |= φ1 and M, sa |= φ2
M, sa |= Xφ iff M, sa+1 |= φ
M, sa |= Fφ iff there exists k ≥ a such that M, sk |= φ
M, sa |= Oφ iff there exists k ≤ a such that M, sk |= φ
M, sa |= Gφ iff, for all k ≥ a, M, sk |= φ
M, sa |= φ1Uφ2 iff there exists c ≥ a such thatM, sc |= φ2 and, for all a ≤ b < c,M, sb |= φ1
4.7 Specification of Routing Protocol in LTL
In this section, we will specify the routing protocol properties. Assume we have
four transactions T1, T2, T3 and T4 accessing four ordered sets of routers D1, D2, D3
and D4, respectively. These transactions are iterated infinitely often to generate
an infinite history. The data items in the sets represent the different routers. Here,
we represent our protocol using four different transactions accessing the ordered
routers in such a way as to produce a gap in the accesses. The router item sets
are as follows:
D1 = {x3, x4}, D2 = {x3, x4}, D3 = {x3, x5}, D4 = {x4, x5}.
The transactions are as follows:
T1 : {begin1, r1(x3), w1(x3), r1(x4), w1(x4), end1};
T2 : {begin2, r2(x3), w2(x3), r2(x4), w2(x4), end2};
T3 : {begin3, r3(x3), w3(x3), r3(x5), w3(x5), end3};
T4 : {begin4, r4(x4), w4(x4), r4(x5), w4(x5), end4};
Here, we have a gap G1, where one data element (x4) is skipped in transaction
T3, and can create cycles of sizes 2, 3 and 4. Accordingly, we can tell that we will
have a cycle with a length of 3 and we will only be checking for this cycle. The
transactions arrive at the scheduler S in the order T1, T2, T3 and then T4. The
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semantics of the formula ϕ are given by a truth relation M, si |= ϕ, where M is
a (Kripke) structure for LTL which satisfies the basic properties of the histories
given in (P1)-(P5) below. Given a state si, these properties will yield a matching
sequence of steps of reads and writes which becomes true in si, si+1, . . . . These will
be used in conjunction with a LTL specification of the following routing protocol
history, h:
h = r1(x3)w1(x3)r3(x3)w3(x3)r2(x3)w2(x3)r2(x4)
w2(x4)r1(x4)w1(x4)r4(x4)w4(x4)r4(x5)w4(x5)r3(x5)w3(x5)
The property (P6) will be the LTL formulae that specify the existence of a cycle.
We also add to the beginning and ending of the transactions the propositions
begini and endi, respectively, indicating when a transaction begins and ends.
Using temporal logic operators, we encode the properties (P1) - (P6) of the
protocol in LTL. We present an encoded LTL code for every property for all the
transactions below. We only present an example of each property, where this
example is to unfold the LTL formula in NuSMV. The remaining unfoldings are
described in the following section. The properties of the protocol are as follows:
(P1) No two reads without a write in-between
Any transaction which has completed a read step to one data item cannot read
another data item without having it write to the first one prior to the second
read. If x <D y, which means that x precedes y in the data item domain, D, ri(y)
cannot be executed before wi(x) [73]. This property is to maintain the structure
of multi-step transactions as per Definition 4.4.1. We can encode this property
into the LTL formula as follows:
σ1 =
∧
i≥1
∧
x,y∈Di,x<Dy
G[(ri(x)⇒ F (wi(x) ∧ F (ri(y)))]
Taking the case of T1, this means that T1 cannot read x3 and x4, where x3 <D x4,
without having first written to x3. This is encoded into LTL in NuSMV as:
LTLSPEC G (T1=r1x3 -> (F (T1=w1x3 & F (T1=r1x4))))
We can also write it in another way as:
LTLSPEC G (((T1=r1x4) & O(T1=r1x3)) -> O(T1=w1x3))
(P2) A write step happens if an item was read
A transaction Ti can only write to x if it has read x beforehand [73].
σ2 =
∧
i≥1
∧
x∈Di
G[(wi(x)⇒ O(ri(x)))]
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Taking the case of T1, this means that if T1 accomplished a write step on x3, it
must have previously read x3 to ensure that we have read and write steps to each
data item x. This is encoded into LTL in NuSMV as follows:
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3) -> O(T1=r1x3))
(P3) A step remains true until the next operation of the same transac-
tion itself becomes true
No changes will be made to a read/write step until the next operation in Ti be-
comes true, i.e., if ri(x)/wi(x) is true, it is unchanged until the next step, where
x <D y, becomes true [73].
σ3 =
∧
i≥1
∧
x∈Di
G[wi(x)⇒ ¬(ri(x))] ∧
∧
i≥1
∧
x,y∈Di,x<Dy
G[ri(y)⇒ ¬(wi(x))]
If T1 reads x3, then r1(x3) stays true until T1 has written to x3, at which point
r1(x3) becomes false and w1(x3) becomes true. After that, if T1 needs to read
another data item, say x4, then w1(x3) becomes false and r1(x4) becomes true.
This property is encoded into LTL in NuSMV as follows:
LTLSPEC G(((T1=w1x3) -> !(T1=r1x3)) & G((T1=r1x4) -> !(T1=w1x3)))
(P4) Each successive state includes only one occurrence of a step
This is adopted so as not to have two different steps that are false in a given state,
and after that the same steps are true in a subsequent state [73].
σ4 =
∧
i,i′≥1
1≤j,j′≤m
i6=i′,j 6=j′
G[¬((¬(ri(xj) ∧ ¬ri′(xj′)) ∧X(ri(xj) ∧ ri′(xj′)))
∧ ¬((¬ri(xj) ∧ ¬wi′(xj′)) ∧X(ri(xi) ∧ wi′(xj′)))
∧ ¬((¬wi(xj) ∧ ¬wi′(xj′)) ∧X(wi(xj) ∧ wi′(x′j)))]
This property emphasizes the fact that if, say, transaction T1 reads item x3, then it
cannot simultaneously write and read in the next step; that is, only one successful
step can happen in each state. This is written in LTL for T1 in NuSMV as follows:
LTLSPEC G ((T1=begin1) -> X!((T1=r1x3)&(T1=w1x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x3) -> X!((T1=w1x3)&(T1=r1x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x4) -> X!((T1=w1x4)&(T1=end1)))
(P5) Any given transaction can read and write only once to a data item
[73]
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For all x ∈ Di, a transaction Ti can only read data item x once and only write to
data item x once.
σ5 = (
∧
i≥1
∧
x∈Di
G¬[ri(x) ∧ F (¬ri(x) ∧ Fri(x))Uendi])
∧ (
∧
i≥1
∧
x∈Di
G¬[wi(x) ∧ F (¬wi(x) ∧ Fwi(x))Uendi])
This means that a transaction can only access the data item once for both the
read and write steps in a given history. If transaction T1 writes on data item x3
having previously read x3, it is not allowed to read x3 again until transaction T1
ends. This is encoded into LTL as follows:
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3 & O(T1=r1x3)) -> (F!(T1=r1x3)))U(T1=end1)
(P6) There is a cycle of length 3
The conflict graph of the routing protocol is serializable if there is no cycle in the
conflict graph G of a history h that is generated by the protocol. Since we found
a maximum gap G = 1 (G1), this means that we only need to check for a cycle of
length 3 (C3). If we find this cycle, this means that the history is not serializable.
To achieve this, we use the following LTL formula:
σ6 =
∧
i,j,k≥1
i 6=j 6=k
∧
x,y∈Di
z∈Dj,Dk
y∈Dk,Di
! G[(ri(x) ∨ wi(x))⇒ F (wj(x) ∨ (wj(x) ∧ (wj(z) ∨ rj(z))))⇒
F (wk(x) ∧ wk(z) ∧ wk(y) ∨ (wk(x) ∧ (wk(z) ∧ (wk(y)))⇒ F (wi(y)]
In this LTL formula we are looking to see if we can have a cycle of length 3. A
cycle can be produced by three or more transactions where the first transaction
conflicts with the second, creating an edge from the first to the second transaction
in the conflict graph, and where the second transaction conflicts with the third,
similarly creating an edge from the second to the third transaction in the conflict
graph. Finally, the third transaction conflicts with the first, creating an edge from
the third to the first transaction in the graph. In this scenario, we will have a cycle
of length 3 which matches our goal. This LTL formula will look for a similar match
according to the transactions available. This is encoded into LTL in NuSVM as
follows:
LTLSPEC !G((T1=r1x3)->F(T3=w3x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T1=w1x4))
This will check whether there is no cycle of this form. This will detect the cycle
T1T3T2T1 of length 3. As a result, the NuSMV model checker will give a counter-
example stating that this condition has not been satisfied, which means that it
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is not the case that we do not have this cycle, i.e., we have a cycle. The error is
shown in Figure 4.3. If we remove the ! from the beginning, this will not cause an
error, and instead we will have a result that is returned as being true.
Figure 4.3: Counterexample on cycle T1T3T2T1.
The following LTL formula in NuSMV will check if there is a cycle of length 3
formed as T1T2T4T1:
LTLSPEC !G((T1=r1x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T1=w1x4))
The result in Figure 4.4 indicates a counterexample, which means that this cycle
exists.
Figure 4.4: Counterexample on cycle T1T2T4T1.
The following will check if there is a cycle of length 3 formed as T2T1T4T2:
LTLSPEC !G((T2=r2x3)->F(T1=w1x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T2=w2x4))
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Figure 4.5 shows a result that indicates a counterexample, which again means that
this cycle exists.
Figure 4.5: Counterexample on cycle T2T1T4T2.
The following formula will check if there is a cycle of length 3 formed as T3T2T4T3:
LTLSPEC !G((T3=r3x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T3=w3x5))
Figure 4.6 indicates that a counterexample is given, which means that this cycle
exists.
Figure 4.6: Counterexample on cycle T3T2T4T3.
The following formula will check if there is a cycle of length 3 formed as T3T1T4T3:
LTLSPEC !G((T3=r3x3)->F(T1=w1x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T3=w3x5))
Figure 4.7 indicates that a counterexample is given, which means that this cycle
exists.
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Figure 4.7: Counterexample on cycle T3T1T4T3.
The following formula will check if there is a cycle of length 3 formed as T3T1T4T3:
LTLSPEC !G((T4=r4x4)->F(T2=w2x4)->F(T3=w3x5)->F(T4=w4x5))
Figure 4.8 indicates that a counterexample is given, which means that this cycle
exists.
Figure 4.8: Counterexample on cycle T3T1T4T3 .
4.8 Verification of the Routing Protocol using
the NuSMV model checker
We will use the NuSMV model checker [80] to determine whether the protocol
specifications expressed in LTL hold, or otherwise. The model checker will return
a true result if the specification of the required property conforms with all system
behaviours; otherwise, a counterexample will be given by NuSMV that represents
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the error source. Encoding the protocol in LTL is shown in Appendix A. We will
first explain some keywords and variables used in the model. We used MODULE
move(Tr,n,Ta,Tb,Tc). The variables (Tr,n,Ta,Tb,Tc) represent:
Tr: a transaction that is currently in process.
n: an integer indicating the number of the transaction.
Ta, Tb, Tc: other transactions that are waiting in the queue.
T1,T2,T3, T4: transactions number one, two, three and four.
r1x1: T1 reads item x1.
w1x1: T1 writes on item x1.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a protocol to be used in routing administration.
The importance of this work is in the different ways routers can be accessed by an
unlimited number of concurrent transactions, and how correctness (serializability)
can be proved when there are gaps in successive accesses to routers using the
results in [77]. We have given the specification and verification of the protocol
using LTL, which was then coded into the NuSMV model checker. In order to
prove serializability, so as to determine if a conflict graph contains a cycle when
the number of transactions is unlimited, we computed the gaps in router accesses
from which the specific length of cycle to be checked was calculated, rather than
searching for cycles of all possible lengths. The anticipated benefits of this work
are in the verification of administrative routing protocols. Despite the contribution
of this research, and indeed its different potential applications, it is limited by the
order in which the transactions have to access the data items. This opens the door
to further research in this area. Future work will consider other situations where
data is accessed in a different manner.
Chapter 5
Synchronous Network Flooding
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in the literature in Section 3.2, distributed systems can be specified
as a composition of the specifications of their constituent components using well-
studied process-calculi approaches such as CSP [1], CCS [2], the pi-calculus [70],
the Ambient Calculus [71] and I/O automata [72]. These methods are useful
when components have significant internal actions/states that affect the associated
external actions, but which need to be abstracted away to prove the properties
of the external behaviour. Our interest in this chapter is the network flooding
algorithm where individual components, in this case physical nodes in a network,
have minimal internal states. The global properties to be proved derive their
complexity from the topology of the network graph. It may be difficult to achieve
a desired global topology as some kind of composition of components, and may
necessitate an extra proof to show that the topology has indeed been achieved.
We choose a more direct logic-based approach specifying the overall system - both
algorithm and network topology - as a set of temporal logic constraints in order
to prove the required properties [81]. This has the added benefit that a different
network topology can be easily specified by changing a single constraint, rather
than many components, in order to achieve the same effect.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe the synchron-
ous flooding algorithm. Section 5.3 then defines the temporal logic and operators
used in the specification. The specification for the network flooding is given in
Section 5.4, along with the proof obligation for the basic property of termination.
This is applied when comparing termination in different network topologies in
Section 5.5. A worked example is described in Section 5.6, as well as its proof in
NuSMV. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.7.
57
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5.2 The Synchronous Flooding Algorithm
Distributed network routing algorithms deal with directing and redirecting mes-
sages between the different network routers and end points [17]. We refer to
routers and endpoints as nodes. Synchronous distributed algorithms assume a
‘global clock’ where actions happen in clock ticks, or rounds. This means that the
network has bounded link delays and lockstep synchronization with pulses of the
global clock. In the message synchronization property, a message sent from node
v to neighbour u at pulse p of v must be delivered to u before pulse p + 1 of u
[20]. In the first round, a message is sent from the initial node to its neighbours,
as shown in Figure 5.1(b). In the second round, the neighbours which receive this
message will forward it to all of its neighbours except the ones from which it was
received. Eventually, all the nodes in the network will receive the message in a
particular round.
In this chapter, we investigate ‘memoryless’ flooding; that is, a node does
not explicitly remember if it has previously taken part in the process or which
other nodes have previously interacted with it. This may happen, for example,
if the node does not have enough memory to store its past history or there are
multiple flooding operations occurring simultaneously which it does not want to,
or cannot, distinguish. It does, however, know which node(s) sent it the message in
the present round and forwards copies of the message to all its other neighbours.
Note that if in any round a node receives the message from all its neighbours,
it does not need to do anything in the subsequent round. If at some point no
node forwards the message we say that flooding has terminated. It is hard to be
sure whether the flooding process will ever terminate, especially in complicated
topologies with cycles. Figures 5.1(a)-(c) demonstrate the synchronous flooding
algorithm in a network of four nodes. Nodes which hold a message “M” are double-
circled. Figures 5.2 (a)-(e) demonstrates another example of the synchronous
flooding algorithm in a network of three nodes; again, nodes which hold a message
“M” are double-circled.
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(a) Round 0
(b) Round 1
(c) Round 2
Figure 5.1: Flooding example 1
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(a) Round 0 (b) Round 1 (c) Round 2
(d) Round 3 (e) Round 4
Figure 5.2: Flooding example 2
5.3 Linear Temporal Logic
In both this and the following chapters we will use standard Linear Temporal
Logic with the temporal operators defined below.
5.3.1 Syntax of LTL
The LTL alphabet consists of a set of propositional symbols Pi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (we
will use different capital letters to P in different contexts), booleans ¬,∧,>,⊥,
and temporal operators X, Y, F, G. Formulae in LTL are those generated by:
φ ::= Pi|¬φ|φ1 ∧ φ2|Xφ|Y φ|Fφ|Gφ
The Boolean connectives ∨, ⇒ and ⇔ will be defined in terms of ¬ and ∧ in the
usual manner.
5.3.2 Semantics of LTL
Linear Temporal Logic is interpreted over a sequence of temporal states (which
we sometimes refer to as ‘points in time’, even though they may not themselves
represent real time) s0, . . . , sa, . . . (a ∈ N). An interpretation of LTL, I(sa), at
a given state sa assigns truth values P
Is(a)
i to the propositional symbols Pi. A
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structure M is a sequence of interpretations I(s0), . . . , I(sa), . . . for the sequence
of states. The semantics of the LTL formula φ are given by a truth relationship
M, sa |= φ, which means that φ holds at state sa in the structure M . The relation
|= is defined inductively as follows:
M, sa |= Pi iff pI(sa)i = >
M, sa |= ¬φ iff M, sa 6|= φ
M, sa |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff M, sa |= φ1 and M, sa |= φ2
M, sa |= Xφ iff M, sa+1 |= φ
M, sa |= Yφ iff M, sa−1 |= φ (a > 0)
M, sa |= Fφ iff there exists k ≥ a such that M, sk |= φ
M, sa |= Gφ iff, for all k ≥ a, M, sk |= φ
Intuitively, the temporal operator X reads as “in the next state”, Y reads as “in
the previous state”, F reads as “in some future state”, and G reads as “in all
future states”. A structure M is a model of an LTL formula φ if
M, s0 |= φ
In general, a given LTL formula φ will have many models. The behaviour of
network flooding in different contexts (e.g., in different network topologies) is a
set of models. We specify such network flooding in temporal logic by giving a LTL
formula φ whose models correspond exactly to the behaviour exhibited by network
flooding. We can then use this φ to construct further LTL formulae (called ‘proof
obligations’) that assert the properties of φ such as when flooding behaviour leads
to termination.
5.4 Specification of the Synchronous Flooding
Algorithm
In the specification here, temporal logic states will correspond to rounds in the
progression of the network flooding. Successive rounds change the state of the
network; for example, the nodes in the network that are receiving messages in
a particular round. Let N be the set of nodes in the size of the network under
consideration. The following subsections give the propositions and constraints on
these nodes that define the behaviour of the rounds.
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5.4.1 Edge Propositions
The set of graph edge propositions is given by:
{E{g,h} | g, h ∈ N, g 6= h}
Intuitively, E{g,h} is true if there is an edge between the distinct nodes g and h
in the graph. Note that we have used a set {g, h} as a subscript in E{g,h}, which
is to indicate that E{g,h} is the same proposition as E{h,g}, i.e., edges in N are
undirected, and to say that an edge from g to h is the same as saying that there
is an edge from h to g. We can specify whether two nodes g and h have an
edge between them by specifying whether E{g,h} is True or False. In this way,
a specific graph topology can be defined one edge at a time. Secondly, we can
give general Boolean constraints on the edge propositions. The set of solutions for
the constraints is the set of combinations of the edge propositions that are True,
corresponding to a set of graph topologies for N . As a third possibility, we may
choose not to specify any Boolean constraints on edge propositions if we want to
prove some particular network flooding property for all graph topologies on N .
However, the use of edge propositions does require a basic temporal constraint,
namely that the Boolean value of an edge variable is time-independent. Nodes
g and h have an edge between them either always or never, as edges represent
physical connections that do not change with time. This temporal constraint is
given by:
φe ≡
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(GE{g,h} ∨G¬E{g,h})
5.4.2 Send-message Propositions
Messages may be sent between nodes g and h in both directions. Thus, we have
the send propositions
{Sg,h | g, h ∈ N, g 6= h}
where Sg,h is true in a particular round if node g sends a message to node h in
that same round. As sending messages between nodes is directional, Sg,h and Sh,g
are different propositions which may differ on their respective truth values in each
round. Also, the sending of messages is time-dependent, so the truth value of a
particular send will vary over time. The basic constraint on send propositions
relates to the edge propositions, as messages can only be sent from node g to
node h along an edge from g to h, and accordingly E{g,h} has to be True. The
CHAPTER 5. SYNCHRONOUS NETWORK FLOODING 63
constraint is:
φs ≡
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
G(Sg,h ⇒ E{g,h})
This states that, at any given point in time, if a message is sent from node g
to node h, i.e., that Sg,h is True, then there must be an edge between g and
h at that point in time, i.e., E{g,h} is True. This constraint and, indeed, edge
propositions in general are only needed when a class of graph topologies for N is
being considered where edges may be present in particular topologies in the class
but absent in others. If a fixed graph topology is under consideration, we do not
need edge propositions as we can explicitly restrict the set of send propositions to
pairs of nodes between which we know edges exist.
5.4.3 Message-received Propositions
We have a set of propositions Mg for the nodes g ∈ N
{Mg | g ∈ N}
such that, in any given round, Mg is True if node g receives a message. In our
model of the flooding algorithm, after the initial round, node g holds a message if
it has been received by g in that same round, i.e., some neighbour node h sends
a message to g in that round - see the first conjunct in φm below. However, node
h will only send a message to g if g did not send a message to h in the previous
round - see the second conjunct in φm below.
φm ≡ (XG
∧
g∈N
(Mg ⇔
∨
h∈N,
h 6=g
Sh,g)) ∧ (XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(Sg,h ⇔ Y(Mg ∧ ¬Sh,g)))
5.4.4 Initial Conditions
The initial temporal state corresponds to the initial round when some initial node
holds a message which is then sent to all its neighbours in the next round, thus
triggering network flooding. Therefore, Mg will be true for exactly one i0 ∈ N and,
as our send-message propositions are True in the round that the corresponding
message is received, no send-message proposition is True in the initial round.
These two conditions are captured in the two outer-level conjuncts below:
φi ≡ (Mi0 ∧
∧
g∈N,g 6=i0
¬Mg) ∧ (
∧
g,h∈N
¬Sg,h)
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If we want to vary the initial node, we can use the following variable version:
φiv ≡ (
∨
i∈M
Mi ∧
∧
g∈N,g 6=i
¬Mg) ∧ (
∧
g,h∈N
¬Sg,h)
5.4.5 Topological Constraints
In 4.1, we stated that edges of N can be defined in one of three ways:
(i) explicitly define a single topology for N by listing the edges;
(ii) implicitly define a class of topologies for N by defining the constraints on
edges in N ;
(iii) allow for all topologies in N .
Case (iii) means that there are no constraints. We give a worked example of case
(i) later in the chapter. Here, we consider case (ii), and show how common classes
of network topologies that are of interest in network flooding can be defined by
Boolean constraints on the propositions E{g,h}(g, h ∈ N).
5.4.5.1 Regular Graphs
Suppose that N has n nodes:
N = {g1, . . . , gn}
A regular graph with nodes N has degree m, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1, i.e., every node
g ∈ N has m neighbours. The class of all regular topologies in N is specified by
the following condition on the edge propositions below. We denote the cardinality
of a set H by |H|.
φtop ≡
∨
1≤m<n−1
∧
g∈N
∨
H⊆N−{g},
|H|=m
(
∧
h∈H
E{g,h} ∧
∧
h/∈H
¬E{g,h})
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For the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, φtop instantiates to:
( ((E{1,2} ∧ ¬E{1,3} ∧ ¬E{1,4}) ∨ (E{1,3} ∧ ¬E{1,2} ∧ ¬E{1,4}) ∨ (E{1,4} ∧ ¬E{1,2} ∧ ¬E{1,3}))
∧ ((E{2,1} ∧ ¬E{2,3} ∧ ¬E{2,4}) ∨ (E{2,3} ∧ ¬E{2,1} ∧ ¬E{2,4}) ∨ (E{2,4} ∧ ¬E{2,1} ∧ ¬E{2,3}))
∧ ((E{3,1} ∧ ¬E{3,2} ∧ ¬E{3,4}) ∨ (E{3,2} ∧ ¬E{3,1} ∧ ¬E{3,4}) ∨ (E{3,4} ∧ ¬E{3,1} ∧ ¬E{3,2}))
∧ ((E{4,1} ∧ ¬E{4,2} ∧ ¬E{4,3}) ∨ (E{4,2} ∧ ¬E{4,1} ∧ ¬E{4,3}) ∨ (E{4,3} ∧ ¬E{4,1} ∧ ¬E{4,2})) )
∨
( ((E{1,2} ∧ E{1,3} ∧ ¬E{1,4}) ∨ (E{1,3} ∧ ¬E{1,2} ∧ E{1,4}) ∨ (E{1,4} ∧ E{1,2} ∧ ¬E{1,3}))
∧ ((E{2,1} ∧ E{2,3} ∧ ¬E{2,4}) ∨ (E{2,3} ∧ ¬E{2,1} ∧ E{2,4}) ∨ (E{2,4} ∧ E{2,1} ∧ ¬E{2,3}))
∧ ((E{3,1} ∧ E{3,2} ∧ ¬E{3,4}) ∨ (E{3,2} ∧ ¬E{3,1} ∧ E{3,4}) ∨ (E{3,4} ∧ E{3,1} ∧ ¬E{3,2}))
∧ ((E{4,1} ∧ E{4,2} ∧ ¬E{4,3}) ∨ (E{4,2} ∧ ¬E{4,1} ∧ E{4,3}) ∨ (E{4,3} ∧ E{4,1} ∧ ¬E{4,2})) )
5.4.5.2 Expander Graphs
Expanders are a very important class of graphs (having the property of being
simultaneously sparse and well connected) that have applications in various areas
of computer science and mathematics; for instance, in the design and analysis
of communication networks, cryptography, error-correcting codes, pseudorandom-
ness, complexity, coding theory, metric embeddings, etc. (for details, see this well-
known survey [56]). For example, in the context of distributed computer networks
they have been used for building censorship-resistant networks [57, 58], fault toler-
ant networks [59], efficient (Byzantine) agreement and leader election algorithms
[60, 61, 62, 63], analysing information spreading, etc. [64]. Thus, even the efficient
construction (in static or dynamic fault-tolerant settings) of expander networks is
an important line of research [65, 66, 67, 68, 69].
Intuitively, an ‘expander’ graph N is one where every subset S ⊆ N of vertices
expands ‘quickly’; how quickly it expands is determined by an ‘expansion para-
meter’. A graph N has expansion parameter  if, for every subset S ⊆ N with
|S| ≤ |N |/2, the set of edges connecting nodes in S with nodes not in S is greater
than or equal to |S|. We can constrain the network N to topologies with the
expansion parameter  by the following Boolean constraint on propositions:
φtop ≡
∧
S⊆N,
|S|≤|N|/2
∨
T⊆N{×}N,
|T |≥|S|
∧
{g,h}∈T
(E{g,h} ∧ ({g, h} ∪ S 6= ∅) ∧ ({g, h} * S))
Here, the set N{×}N is the set of ordered pairs of nodes (g, h) in the Cartesian
product N×N viewed as two-element sets {g, h} (so that {g, h} = {h, g}, whereas
(g, h) 6= (h, g)). Also, {g, h} ∪ S 6= ∅ and {g, h} * S are evaluated as being True
or False accordingly in each respective conjunct. The constraint essentially states
that corresponding to every subset of nodes S, with |S| ≤ |N |/2, there is a set of
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edges T , where |T | ≥ |S|, each of which connects a node in S with a node not in
S.
5.4.6 Termination
The required property that first comes to mind in network flooding is termination.
Termination occurs if, in some round, no node in the system receives a message.
In our temporal model, this means that no message-received proposition mg will
be true. So, if network flooding is modelled by φe, φs, φm, φi and φtop as above,
then the proof obligation for termination is:
φe ∧ φs ∧ φm ∧ φi ∧ φtop ⇒ F
∧
g∈N
¬mg
5.5 Applications
We use our specification of flooding to compare the time it takes for the flooding
algorithm to terminate in different topologies. Whilst standard LTL is not de-
signed to resolve timing issues, we can determine which network topology takes
fewer rounds to terminate by superimposing the temporal behaviour of the net-
work in one topology on the behaviour of another. So, the temporal model has two
cases of network flooding, on the same set of nodes but with different connections
and proceeding together in rounds in a lock-step fashion, and with two messages
- one for each topological case - circulating in the network. We can illustrate this
model with a simple example. Suppose that N = {0, 1, 2} and the two topologies
are constructed as shown in the following figure:
Figure 5.3: Flooding on two topologies
Assume 0 is the initial node in both cases. We illustrate the progression of
the rounds in terms of the send-message propositions Sg,h and message-received
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propositions Mg. Distinguishing these propositions for the two topologies, we have
the following propositions:
Topology1 : S10,1, S
1
0,2, S
1
1,2,M
1
0 ,M
1
1 ,M
1
2
Topology2 : S20,1, S
2
1,2,M
2
0 ,M
2
1 ,M
2
2
The propositions that are True in successive rounds in the two models are shown
in Figures 5.4(a)-(d) below. Nodes which hold a message are circled.
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(a) Round 0
(b) Round 1
(c) Round 2
(d) Round 3
Figure 5.4: Flooding rounds in two topologies
Note that in round 3 M10 is True, whereas M
2
0 , M
2
1 , or M
2
2 are not True. So,
Topology2 terminates before Topology1 as there is a round in which no node holds
a message in Topology2. whereas a node still holds a message in Topology1. We
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give the formal proof that has to be carried out in the general case below.
Given two topologies Topology1 and Topology2 on a set of nodes N , the proof
obligation that Topology1 terminates before Topology2 is:
(φ1e ∧ φ1s ∧ φ1m ∧ φ1i ∧ φ1top) ∧ (φ2e ∧ φ2s ∧ φ2m ∧ φ2i ∧ φ2top)⇒
F((
∧
g∈N
¬M1g ) ∧ (
∨
g∈N
M2g )) (5.1)
Here, φ1e, φ
1
s and φ
1
m relabel the propositional variables from φe, φs and φm of
subsections 5.4.1, 5.4.2 , 5.4.3 respectively, adding a superscript 1, whilst φ2e, φ
2
s
and φ2m do the same but with a superscript 2. The formulae φ
1
i and φ
2
i also possibly
differ in their respective initial nodes, and φ1top and φ
2
top according to the topologies
that they define. In (5.1), we check for validity. So, if φ1top and φ
2
top each define a
range of topologies, (5.1) is True (valid) if all topologies of φ1top terminate before
all topologies of φ2top . If (5.1) returns False, then some topology of φ
2
top terminates
before some topology of φ1top . We could then proceed to test if all the topologies
of φ2top terminate before all those of φ
1
top by checking the validity of:
(φ2e ∧ φ2s ∧ φ2m ∧ φ2i ∧ φ2top) ∧ (φ1e ∧ φ1s ∧ φ1m ∧ φ1i ∧ φ1top)⇒
F((
∧
g∈N
¬M2g ) ∧ (
∨
g∈N
M1g )) (5.2)
It is possible that (5.2) would also return False, in which case some topologies
of φ1top would terminate before some topologies of φ
2
top , and further that some
topologies of φ2top would terminate before some topologies of φ
1
top .
Apart from varying topologies of the network N , we could also vary the initial
node. This can be achieved by replacing the initial conditions φi that have a
fixed initial node, by initial conditions φiv that vary the initial node, in the proof
obligation. Thus,
(φ1e ∧ φ1s ∧ φ1m ∧ φ1iv ∧ φ1top) ∧ (φ2e ∧ φ2s ∧ φ2m ∧ φ2iv ∧ φ2top)⇒
F((
∧
g∈N
¬M1g ) ∧ (
∨
g∈N
M2g )) (5.3)
is valid if, for all topologies φ1top starting from any initial node, flooding terminates
before flooding terminates in any topology φ2top with any initial node.
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5.6 Worked Example
Here, we compare the termination of two topologies on a network of five nodes
through the use of formal proofs. The two network topologies for this example are
depicted in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Two topologies containing five nodes
To check if a property is met, after creating the system model and its properties
we encode it into the model checker NuSMV to verify if the property is satisfied.
Synchronous flooding block diagram representing this is shown below in Figure
5.6.
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Synchronous 
Flooding Model 
Flooding 
Properties 
Model Checker 
NuSMV 
True 
Counter-
example 
Yes NO 
Topology1  
Topology2  
Property 
satisfied? 
 
Figure 5.6: Synchronous flooding model checking block diagram.
Firstly, we will test to see if one topology terminates before the other, where both
have the initial node 0. As mentioned in 5.4.2, we may optimize the number of
propositions used by only having send-message propositions for the edges that are
present in each of the respective topologies, which is valid in this instance as we
are comparing two fixed topologies. This restriction on send-message variables
for each topology also defines the topology, and thus no additional variable edge
propositions Ei,j are required. Thus, we have the following propositions for the
two topologies in Figure 5.5 above:
Topology1 : S10,1, S
1
1,0, S
1
0,2, S
1
2,0, S
1
0,3, S
1
3,0,
S10,4, S
1
4,0, S
1
1,4, S
1
4,1, S
1
2,3, S
1
3,2,
M10 ,M
1
1 ,M
1
2 ,M
1
3 ,M
1
4
Topology2 : S20,1, S
2
1,0, S
2
1,2, S
2
2,1, S
2
2,3, S
2
3,2, S
2
3,4, S
2
4,3, S
2
0,4, S
2
4,0,
M20 ,M
2
2 ,M
2
2 ,M
2
3 ,M
2
4
As there are no edge propositions, we ignore φe, φs and φtop and only consider φi
and φm for each topology. Instantiating the definitions of φi and φm of subsections
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5.4.4 and 5.4.3 respectively, yields:
φ1i ≡ M10 ∧ ¬M11 ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14∧
¬(S10,1 ∨ S11,0 ∨ S10,2 ∨ S12,0 ∨ S10,3 ∨ S13,0∨
S10,4 ∨ S14,0 ∨ S11,4 ∨ S14,1 ∨ S12,3 ∨ S13,2)
φ1m ≡ (XG( (M10 ⇔ S11,0 ∨ S12,0 ∨ S13,0 ∨ S14,0)∧
(M11 ⇔ S10,1 ∨ S14,1)∧
(M12 ⇔ S10,2 ∨ S13,2)∧
(M13 ⇔ S10,3 ∨ S12,3)∧
(M14 ⇔ S10,4 ∨ S11,4)) ) ∧
(XG( (S10,1 ⇔ Y(M10 ∧ ¬S11,0))∧
(S11,0 ⇔ Y(M11 ∧ ¬S10,1))∧
(S12,0 ⇔ Y(M12 ∧ ¬S10,2))∧
(S10,2 ⇔ Y(M10 ∧ ¬S12,0))∧
(S10,3 ⇔ Y(M10 ∧ ¬S13,0))∧
(S13,0 ⇔ Y(M13 ∧ ¬S10,3))∧
(S10,4 ⇔ Y(M10 ∧ ¬S14,0))∧
(S14,0 ⇔ Y(M14 ∧ ¬S10,4))∧
(S11,4 ⇔ Y(M11 ∧ ¬S14,1))∧
(S14,1 ⇔ Y(M14 ∧ ¬S11,4))∧
(S12,3 ⇔ Y(M12 ∧ ¬S13,2))∧
(S13,2 ⇔ Y(M13 ∧ ¬S12,3))) )
φ2i ≡ M20 ∧ ¬M21 ∧ ¬M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧ ¬M24∧
¬(S20,1 ∨ S21,0 ∨ S21,2 ∨ S22,1∨
S22,3 ∨ S23,2 ∨ S23,4 ∨ S24,3 ∨ S20,4 ∨ S24,0)
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φ2m ≡ (XG( (M20 ⇔ S21,0 ∨ S24,0)∧
(M21 ⇔ S20,1 ∨ S22,1)∧
(M22 ⇔ S21,2 ∨ S23,2)∧
(M23 ⇔ S22,3 ∨ S24,3)∧
(M24 ⇔ S23,4 ∨ S20,4)) ) ∧
(XG( (S20,1 ⇔ Y(M20 ∧ ¬S21,0))∧
(S21,0 ⇔ Y(M21 ∧ ¬S20,1))∧
(S21,2 ⇔ Y(M21 ∧ ¬S22,1))∧
(S22,1 ⇔ Y(M22 ∧ ¬S21,2))∧
(S22,3 ⇔ Y(M22 ∧ ¬S23,2))∧
(S23,2 ⇔ Y(M23 ∧ ¬S22,3))∧
(S23,4 ⇔ Y(M23 ∧ ¬S24,3))∧
(S24,3 ⇔ Y(M24 ∧ ¬S23,4))∧
(S24,0 ⇔ Y(M24 ∧ ¬S20,4))∧
(S20,4 ⇔ Y(M20 ∧ ¬S24,0))) )
To prove that Topology1 terminates before Topology2 when the initial node is
selected to be node 0, we need to prove (by (5.2) in section 5.4.5 above, ignoring
φe, φs, and φtop) that:
(φ1m ∧ φ1i ) ∧ (φ2m ∧ φ2i )⇒
F((¬M10 ∧ ¬M11 ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14 ) ∧ (M20 ∨M21 ∨M22 ∨M23 ∨M24 ))
This proof has been carried out using NuSMV and does indeed return True,
showing that Topology1 terminates before Topology2 when the initial node is
selected to be node 0 for both. Appendix B Section B.2 shows encoding this case
in LTL into the NuSMV model checker. Figure 5.7 shows this result.
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Figure 5.7: Toplogy1 terminates before Topology2 with initial node 0.
To verify our specification, we have also used NuSMV to demonstrate that the
following expression, which states that Topology2 terminates before Topology1
when the initial node is selected to be node 0 for both:
(φ2m ∧ φ2i ) ∧ (φ1m ∧ φ1i )
⇒ F((¬M20 ∧ ¬M21 ∧ ¬M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧ ¬M24 ) ∧ (M10 ∨M11 ∨M12 ∨M13 ∨M14 ))
is False. Appendix B Section B.1 shows encoding this case in LTL into the
NuSMV model checker. Indeed, NuSMV does return False as shown in Figure
5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Toplogy2 terminates before Topology1 with initial node 0.
As Topology1 has been proved to terminate before Topology2 with initial node
0, we consider the possibility of Topology1 terminating before Topology2 regardless
of the initial node chosen for each. By the discussion in subsection 5.4.4, this means
replacing φ1i and φ
2
i by the following φ
1
iv and φ
2
iv , respectively:
φ1iv ≡ (M10 ∧ ¬M11 ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14∨
¬M10 ∧M11 ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14∨
¬M10 ∧ ¬M11 ∧M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14∨
¬M10 ∧ ¬M11¬ ∧ ¬M12 ∧M13 ∧ ¬M14∨
¬M10 ∧ ¬M11¬ ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧M14 )
φ2iv ≡ (M20 ∧ ¬M21 ∧ ¬M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧ ¬M24∨
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¬M20 ∧M21 ∧ ¬M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧ ¬M24∨
¬M20 ∧ ¬M21 ∧M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧ ¬M24∨
¬M20 ∧ ¬M21¬ ∧ ¬M22 ∧M23 ∧ ¬M24∨
¬M20 ∧ ¬M21¬ ∧ ¬M22 ∧ ¬M23 ∧M24 )
So, the proof obligation for Topology1 always terminating before Topology2, for
a random choice of initial nodes, is to check the validity of:
(φ1m ∧ φ1iv) ∧ (φ2m ∧ φ2iv)⇒
F((¬M10 ∧ ¬M11 ∧ ¬M12 ∧ ¬M13 ∧ ¬M14 ) ∧ (M20 ∨M21 ∨M22 ∨M23 ∨M24 ))
where we substitute the φ1iv and φ
2
iv given above. The result of executing the proof
in NuSMV is True, i.e., Topology1 terminates before Topology2 regardless of the
starting nodes chosen. The code is shown in Appendix B Section B.3. This result
is shown in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Topology1 terminates before Topology2 always.
5.7 Conclusions
We have provided a specification of network flooding in propositional linear tem-
poral logic suitable for proving termination properties. The specification can cater
for any class of graph topologies for a given size of network; it does not cater for
networks of arbitrary size, however. A temporal-logic specification of flooding for
networks of arbitrary size would need to use first-order temporal logic. Although
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first-order temporal logic can specify problems of unlimited size - for example, the
specification of a transactional system over an unbounded number of data items
given in [54] - there are practical and theoretical obstacles to formal verification
in such logics. Even with the specifications here, and the use of one of the most
powerful model checkers available, NuSMV, proofs will only be possible in practice
for fairly small network sizes. Nevertheless, experimentation with network topo-
logies on a small scale can provide insight into the design of networks on a larger
scale. The intended use of the approach here is to facilitate the design of network
hardware and software by experimentation with different topologies and also dif-
ferent code/algorithms at the nodes. The flooding problem gives an example of a
very basic algorithm at a network node - on receipt of a message, a node sends on
the message to all the neighbours from which it did not receive the message. In the
same way as network topologies can easily be changed by changing the topological
constraints, so too can the code/algorithm at nodes be changed by supplying new,
possibly more sophisticated, message-processing constraints, which can then be
verified.
Chapter 6
Asynchronous Network Flooding
6.1 Introduction
In the synchronous model presented in the previous chapter the sending and receipt
of a message occurred in the same unit of time that was used, that is, in the same
‘round’. Here, we introduce the possibility that the sending and receipt of a
message may occur during different time units. If during some unit in time a
message is sent but is not received in that unit in time, we say that the message
is in ‘transit’. The two main primitives will be:
• Tg,h: a message from node g to node h is in transit
• Rg,h: a message from node g to node h is received
The sending of a message represented by the proposition Si,j in the previous
chapter will correspond to a sent message either being in transit or already re-
ceived. Allowing for the possibility of a sent message not being received immedi-
ately gives our model an element of asynchrony. The asynchronous flooding model
will be fashioned by the kind of properties we are interested in proving. As with
the synchronous case, one of our aims is to be able to compare time to termination
for different topologies. However, it is not interesting to compare the termination
time between two (non-deterministic) asynchronous networks as it is fairly easy
to see that flooding in any such non-trivial network with cycles can continue for
an arbitrarily long time. Thus, flooding in any one of two such networks could
terminate before the other by suitably delaying termination.
We are interested in comparing synchronous and asynchronous networks to see
if asynchronicity can result in earlier termination. This means being able to relate
‘rounds’ in the synchronous case to the asynchronous case. We describe a formal
model of asynchrony in Section 6.2 along with a generalized notion of ‘round’
for the asynchronous case. This will be presented as a model in linear temporal
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logic in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, we will give proof obligations to show that
an asynchronous model can terminate earlier than a synchronous model, and use
these proof obligations to verify examples in NuSMV. Section 6.5 discusses the
achievements of this chapter.
6.2 An Asynchronous Network Flooding Model
In order to define ‘rounds’ for an asynchronous model, it is convenient to define
asynchronous flooding formally as a state transition system (S,→), where S are
the states and → is the transition relation, so that we can clearly identify trans-
itions that we want to exclude as rounds. The states in the state transition system
will be sets of actions which we define beforehand.
Definition 6.2.1 Let N be a finite set of nodes of a network. An action on N is
one of the following actions for nodes g,h ∈ N:
A1 an action Tg,h indicating a message is in transit from node g to node h;
A2 an action Rg,h indicating a message from node g to node h is received;
A3 an action Mg indicating a message has been received at node g from some
other node, or g holds a message as the initial node.
Definition 6.2.2 Suppose that (N,E) is the graph of a network with a set of
nodes N and a set of undirected edges E, and let g0 ∈ N be a fixed initial node.
A state s ∈ S is either the set s0 = {Mg0}, called the initial state, or a finite set
of actions on N satisfying the following conditions:
S1 for all g, h ∈ N , actions Tg,h or Rg,h can only belong to s if there is an edge
between g and h in E;
S2 for all g ∈ N and states s not equal to the initial state, Mg belongs to s iff
Rh,g belongs to s for some h ∈ N .
To define the state transition system, we also need to define the transition relation.
Definition 6.2.3 Given states s, s′ ∈ S, there is a transition s → s′ iff, for all
g, h ∈ N , the following conditions are satisfied:
TS1 if Mg ∈ s and Rh,g, Tg,h /∈ s, then either Tg,h ∈ s′ and Rg,h /∈ s′ or Rg,h ∈ s′
and Tg,h /∈ s′;
TS2 if Mg, Tg,h ∈ s, and Rh,g /∈ s, then Tg,h, Rg,h ∈ s′;
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TS3 if Rh,g ∈ s and Tg,h /∈ s, then Tg,h, Rg,h /∈ s′;
TS4 if Tg,h ∈ s, then Rg,h ∈ s′, and Tg,h ∈ s′ if and only if Mg ∈ s and Rh,g /∈ s;
TS5 if Mg, Tg,h /∈ s, then Tg,h, Rg,h /∈ s′.
Here, s was the last state of the network before the current state of the network,
s′. Condition TS1 states that if there was a message at node g which was not
received from node h, and there was no message in transit from g to h, then g
sends a message to h which may be in transit to h or may have been received by
h. Condition TS2 states that if there was a message at node g which was not
received from node h and there was already a message in transit from g to h,
then the message that was in transit from g to h has been received and another
message from g to h is in transit. Condition TS3 states that if node h has just
sent a message to node g and there was no message in transit from g to h, then no
message sent from g to h is either in transit or has been received by h. Condition
TS4 states that, no matter what the state is of other nodes and messages in the
network, a message that was in transit from node g to node h in one state of the
network is received by h in the next state of the network, and also that there is
another message in transit from g to h if, and only if, g had a message in s and did
not receive a message from h in the last state. Condition TS5 states that if node
g did not have a message and there was not already a message in transit from g
to a node h, then there is no message from g to h, either in transit or received, in
the current state.
We define executions or ‘runs’ of the asynchronous network in terms of the
state transition system.
Definition 6.2.4 Let (N,E) be the graph of a network with set of nodes N and
set of edges E, and let g0 be the initial node. Let (S,→) be the asynchronous
flooding state transition system for this network and initial node, as defined above.
A run of the flooding algorithm, with respect to G = (N,E, g0), is a sequence of
states of S
s0, s1, . . . , si, . . .
such that:
R1 s0 = {g0},
R2 si−1 → si for all i ≥ 1.
This definition of runs allows for states where no node holds a message, as all
messages are in transit (see the example below). In the synchronous model, at
least one node in every state of the network, before termination, holds a message.
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Our extension of the notion of ‘rounds’ to asynchronous flooding is to states in
the state transition system where some node holds a message. A run in which all
states, before termination, have nodes with messages, will be said to be in ‘round
form’.
Definition 6.2.5 Let G = (N,E, g0) be as per the definition of runs above, and
let RG denote the corresponding set of all runs. A run r ∈ RG
r = s0, s1, . . . , si, . . .
is in round form iff, for all i ≥ 0,
Mg ∈ si for some g ∈ N.
Example 6.2.6 Consider the following runs:
r1 = {M0}, {R0,1, R0,2,M1,M2}, {R1,2, R2,1,M1,M2}, {R1,0, R2,0,M0}, {}
r2 = {M0}, {T0,1, T0,2}, {R0,1, R0,2,M1,M2}, {R1,2, R2,1,M1,M2},
{R1,0, R2,0,M0}, {}
r3 = {M0}, {R0,1, T0,2,M1}, {R1,2, R0,2,M2}, {}
Figure 6.1: Example 2.6
Here, r1 is in round form and corresponds to the synchronous execution of G.
The run r2 is not in round form as the second state, {T0,1, T0,2}, has no Mg action.
Note that r3 is in round form as every state, prior to termination, has some Mg
action. However, it is different to r1 and does not correspond to a synchronous
run. Interestingly, the delay in transit of the message from node 0 to node 2 in r3
results in earlier termination for r3, i.e., termination is achieved in fewer rounds.
CHAPTER 6. ASYNCHRONOUS NETWORK FLOODING 82
When choosing a suitable measure of the ‘time taken’ for a run to terminate,
the duration of non-round states, such as {T0,1, T0,2} of r2 above, has no meaning
in terms of numbers of ‘observable’ events in network flooding, i.e., the events
Mg of messages arriving at nodes. In fact, as we show in the theorem below, we
can delete all non-round states from a run in RG and the resulting sub-sequence
of states will still be a run in RG and will be in round form. Therefore, when
considering the runs in RG which terminate the quickest, we can confine our
attention to runs in round form, and the measure of the time taken to termination
is, as in the synchronous case, the number of rounds to termination.
Theorem 6.2.7 Let G = (N,E, g0) be a network graph (N,E) along with an
initial node g0 ∈ N as above. Suppose that r ∈ RG is a run and that rRF is the
sub-sequence of states of r which are rounds. Then, rRF is a run in RG (and is
in round form).
Proof It suffices to show that if we remove the first state that is not a round,
then the resulting sequence of states is still a run. The theorem then follows by
repeatedly removing the first occurrences of non-round states in a similar manner
until no non-round states remain and we are left with a run rRF in round form.
Let
r = s0, s1, . . . , si−1, si, si+1, . . .
where i ≥ 1, s0, . . . , si−1 are rounds and si is not a round. Consider the subsequent
r−i of r given by
r−i = s0, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . (6.1)
We need to show that r−i is a run. Let (S,→) be the state transition system, as in
Definitions 6.2.1 - 6.2.3, generating runs in RG. To show that r−i is a run in RG,
we need to show that r−i can be generated by (S,→). As (S,→) generates a state
sj+1 from the previous state sj alone, by the conditions TS1-TS5 of Definition
6.2.3, it is clear that in both r and r−i: s1 are generated from s0, . . ., si−1 is
generated from si−2, si+2 is generated from si+1, . . .. Therefore, for r−i to be a
run in RG, it only remains to show that si+1 can be generated from si−1. Now, as
si is not a round, si has no Mg and thus no Rg,h actions. So, si consists entirely
of Tg,h actions. Let
si = {Tg1,h1 , . . . , Tgk,hk} (6.2)
where k ≥ 1. As r is a run, we know that si+1 is generated from si The only
condition for (S,→) that generates a state from a state with only Tg,h actions is
TS4, which produces the corresponding set of Rg,h actions. Thus, from (6.2),
si+1 = {Rg1,h1 , . . . , Rgk,hk} (6.3)
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Also, as r is a run, si−1 generates si. The only condition for (S,→) that generates
Tg,h but does not generate Rg,h is TS1. Thus,
{Mg1 , . . . ,Mgk} ⊆ si−1 and {Rh1,g1 , . . . , Rhk,gk , Tg1,h1 , . . . , Tgk,hk} ∩ si−1 = ∅
However, condition TS1 allows Rg,h to be generated instead of the corresponding
Tg,h. Thus, if we generate Rg1,h1 , . . . , Rgk,hk instead of Tg1,h1 , . . . , Tgk,hk of si in
(6.2), we get exactly the state si+1 of (6.3). Hence, si+1 can be generated from
si−1, and so the r−i of (6.1) is a run in RG.
The importance of this theorem when comparing asynchronous and synchronous
systems is explained in Section 6.4 below.
6.3 Temporal Model
Given a network graph and initial node G = (N,E, g0), the states of the linear
temporal logic structure that models G will be exactly the states of the state
transition system (S,→) of G, as given in Section 6.2 above.
6.3.1 Propositions
There is a proposition corresponding to each action in (S,→). Thus, the sets of
propositions are:
(i) message in transit from g to h propositions: {Tg,h | {g, h} is an edge in E};
(ii) message received from g to h propositions: {Rg,h | {g, h} is an edge in E};
(iii) message received at node g propositions: {Mg | g is a node in N}.
6.3.2 States
In Definition 6.2.2, a state s in (S,→) is a finite sets of actions. The corresponding
temporal state will have the propositions of the actions in s returned as True.
However, condition S2 of Definition 6.2.2 which requires that a Mg action belong
to a (non-initial) state iff a Rh,g action that also belongs to some node h, needs
the following additional temporal constraint:
φS2 ≡ XG
∧
g∈N
(Mg ⇔
∨
h∈N,
h 6=g
Rh,g)
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6.3.3 Run constraints
We lift the run constraints directly from the transition relation→ conditions TS1-
TS5 of Definition 6.2.3. Condition TS1 requires that, for all nodes g and h, if an
Mg action belongs to the previous state and Rh,g and Tg,h do not, then either Tg,h
belongs to the current state and Rg,h does not, or Rg,h belongs to the current state
and Tg,h does not. The temporal constraint in terms of the truth values of the
propositions is:
φTS1 ≡ XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
((Y(Mg ∧ ¬Rh,g ∧ ¬Tg,h))⇒ ((Tg,h ∧ ¬Rg,h) ∨ (Rg,h ∧ ¬Tg,h)))
The leftmost X is needed as the TS1-TS5 conditions are from the point of view
of a state with a previous state, so we start after the initial state. Condition
TS2 requires that, for all nodes g and h, if the Mg and Tg,h actions belong to the
previous state and Rh,g does not, then both Tg,h and Rg,h belong to the current
state. The temporal constraint is:
φTS2 ≡ XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
((Y(Mg ∧ Tg,h ∧ ¬Rh,g))⇒ (Tg,h ∧Rg,h))
Condition TS3 requires that, for all nodes g and h, if a Rh,g action belongs to the
previous state and Tg,h does not, then neither Tg,h nor Rg,h belong to the current
state. The temporal constraint is:
φTS3 ≡ XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
((Y(Rh,g ∧ ¬Tg,h))⇒ (¬Tg,h ∧ ¬Rg,h))
Condition TS4 requires that, for all nodes g and h, if a Tg,h action belongs to the
previous state, then Rg,h belongs to the current state and Tg,h is in the current
state iff Mg was in the previous state and Rh,g was not. The temporal constraint
is:
φTS4 ≡ XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
((YTg,h)⇒ Rg,h ∧ (Tg,h ⇔ Y(Mg ∧ ¬Rh,g)))
Condition TS5 requires that, for all nodes g and h, if neither a Mg nor a Tg,h action
belongs to the previous state, then neither Tg,h nor Rg,h belongs to the current
state. The temporal constraint is:
φTS5 ≡ XG
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
((Y(¬Mg ∧ ¬Tg,h))⇒ (¬Tg,h ∧ ¬Rg,h))
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The conditions TS1-TS5 describe synchronous runs if no Tg,h action appears in any
state in (S,→). This corresponds to replacing all Tg,h propositions in φTS1 -φTS5
by False. In this case, if we also substitute Rg,h propositions by Sg,h propositions
in the conjunction φs2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS3 , we get a temporal logic formula
equivalent to the constraint φm for received messages in the synchronous flooding
described in the previous chapter.
We also need to add a temporal constraint to the initial state of (S,→) to be
the set {Mg0}. This means the proposition Mg0 is True and all other propositions
are False. The initial temporal state constraint is:
φinit ≡ (Mg0 ∧
∧
g∈N,
g 6=g0
¬Mg) ∧ (
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(¬Tg,h ∧ ¬Rg,h))
6.3.4 Termination
To specify the termination of a run, it is initially tempting to proceed as in the
synchronous case and specify that there is a state in which no node holds a message.
However, in the asynchronous case it is possible to have many states where no node
holds a message because messages are in transit; clearly, however, if this is the case
then the run has not yet terminated. Thus, we need to specify a state in which
no node holds a message and no messages are in transit. The temporal constraint
for termination is:
φterm ≡ F
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(¬Mg ∧ ¬Tg,h)
6.3.5 Rounds
In Section 6.4 below we will compare the time to termination of synchronous and
asynchronous runs of network flooding. As discussed in Section 6.2, we do so by
counting the rounds in runs of both types. For this, we need all the states of the
asynchronous runs to be rounds, i.e,. some node has to receive a message in every
state before the run terminates. This can be expressed by the constraint that no
state can have a Tg,h action and no Rg,h actions. This does not affect terminated
states, which have no Tg,h and no Rg,h actions. The temporal constraint is:
φround ≡ G¬((
∨
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
Tg,h) ∧ (
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
¬Rg,h))
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6.4 Comparing Asynchronous and Synchronous
Termination
In the previous chapter, we compared the number of rounds taken to termination
in two network topologies by superimposing successive states of rounds in one
topology over the successive states of rounds in the other. In this section, we will
compare the number of rounds to termination of flooding between a terminating
asynchronous network and a synchronous network with the same topology to see if
the asynchronous network can terminate in fewer rounds. We will assume a single
fixed set of nodes and graph topology for both cases and the same initial node.
From the previous chapter, the states in the synchronous network in successive
rounds are the model of the temporal logic formula:
φm ∧ φi, (6.4)
where φm are the message-received constraints and φi are the initial conditions.
In this chapter, the succession of states in the asynchronous case, here called runs,
are the models of the temporal logic formula:
φS2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS2 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS4 ∧ φTS5 ∧ φinit . (6.5)
To prove that there are runs in the asynchronous case that can terminate in fewer
rounds than the synchronous case, we might, tentatively, consider checking for the
validity of the following temporal formula:
¬( φS2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS2 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS4 ∧ φTS5 ∧ φinit ∧ φm ∧ φi (6.6)
⇒ F(
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(¬Mg ∧ ¬Tg,h) ∧ (
∨
g∈N
M sg )) ) (6.7)
Line (6.6) represents the states of the superimposed asynchronous and synchronous
networks and line (6.7) asserts that at some point in time there will be no further
asynchronous actions (i.e., the asynchronous case has terminated) but there will
be some synchronous actions (i.e., the synchronous case has not terminated). The
whole formula spread over lines (6.6) and (6.7) has an outer negation. It is quite
literally asserting that, for all asynchronous and synchronous runs, it is not true
that the asynchronous case terminates before the synchronous. For there to be an
asynchronous run that terminates before the synchronous, the test for the validity
of formula (6.6),(6.7) should return False. As we have used mostly different
propositional variables for asynchronous systems in (6.5) in this chapter to those
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for synchronous systems in (6.4) in the previous chapter, the only variables we
need to relabel are the Mg variables, which we relabel only in the synchronous
case to have a superscript s.
However, there is a problem with the formula (6.6),(6.7). The behaviour of
the asynchronous system in line (6.5) is for runs which may have states that
are not rounds. It is possible that an asynchronous run may terminate in fewer
rounds than a synchronous run, but this will not show up in the temporal logic
formula (6.6),(6.7) as successive states of the asynchronous runs are in lock-step
with rounds of the synchronous runs, and the asynchronous run may have states
that are not rounds. Thus, an asynchronous run may take more states to terminate
than the synchronous run takes rounds (this will show up in (6.6),(6.7)) but the
asynchronous run may actually take fewer rounds of its own (this will not show
up in (6.6),(6.7)). We could restrict the asynchronous runs to those in round form
by adding the extra conjunct φround to the asynchronous behaviour, yielding the
proof obligation:
¬( φS2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS2 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS4 ∧ φTS5 ∧ φround ∧ φinit ∧ φm ∧ φi (6.8)
⇒ F(
∧
g,h∈N,
g 6=h
(¬Mg ∧ ¬Tg,h) ∧ (
∨
g∈N
M sg )) ) (6.9)
However, φround does not eliminate non-round states in an asynchronous run, but
eliminates the whole run if there is a state that is not a round. It could be the
case that a run that has states that are not rounds is nevertheless the one that
terminates in the fewest rounds. Fortunately, this is not a problem if we invoke
Theorem 6.2.7. Theorem 6.2.7 states that if we delete all non-round states in a
run, the remaining sub-sequence of states is still a run. So, even though φround may
eliminate the run which has non-round states but terminates in the fewest number
of rounds, Theorem 6.2.7 guarantees that there will be another run identical to the
eliminated run, but without its non-round states. Thus, formula (6.8),(6.9) is the
required proof obligation that demonstrates that an asynchronous run can(not)
terminate before the synchronous run.
6.4.1 Worked Examples
In 6.4.1.1, we give an example of a network where asynchronous flooding can
terminate before synchronous flooding, and in 6.4.1.1 6.4.1.2 we give an example
of a network where it cannot. To check if a property is met, after creating the
system model and its properties we encode it into the model checker NuSMV to
verify if the property is satisfied. The flooding block diagram representing this is
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shown below in Figure 6.2.
Flooding Model 
Flooding 
Properties 
Model Checker 
NuSMV 
True 
Counter-
example 
Yes NO 
Network 
Property 
satisfied? 
 
Figure 6.2: Synchronous and Asynchronous flooding model checking block dia-
gram.
6.4.1.1 Asynchronous Can Terminate Before Synchronous
We will verify formally that the network in Example 6.2.6, Figure 5.1, has an
asynchronous run which terminates in fewer rounds than the synchronous run
with initial nodes 0 using NuSMV. We have the following propositions for the
asynchronous and synchronous cases, respectively:
Asynchronous : T0,1, T1,0, T0,2, T2,0, T1,2, T2,1,
R0,1, R1,0, R0,2, R2,0, R1,2, R2,1,
M0,M1,M2
Synchronous : S0,1, S1,0, S0,2, S2,0, S1,2, S2,1,
M s0 ,M
s
1 ,M
s
2
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For the asynchronous case, instantiating the definitions of φS2 of Subsection 6.3.2,
φTS1 -φTS5 and φinit of Subsection 6.3.3, and φround of Subsection 6.3.5, we have:
φS2 ≡ XG ((M0 ⇔ R1,0 ∨R2,0)∧
(M1 ⇔ R0,1 ∨R2,1)∧
(M2 ⇔ S0,2 ∨ S1,2))
φTS1 ≡ XG (((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ ((T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1) ∨ (R0,1 ∧ ¬T0,1)))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ ((T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0) ∨ (R1,0 ∧ ¬T1,0)))∧
((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ ((T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2) ∨ (R0,2 ∧ ¬T0,2)))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ ((T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0) ∨ (R2,0 ∧ ¬T2,0)))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R2,1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ ((T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2) ∨ (R1,2 ∧ ¬T1,2)))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ ((T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1) ∨ (R2,1 ∧ ¬T2,1))))
φTS2 ≡ XG (((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ T0,1))⇒ (T0,1 ∧R0,1))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ T1,0))⇒ (T1,0 ∧R1,0))∧
((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ T0,2))⇒ (T0,2 ∧R0,2))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ T2,0))⇒ (T2,0 ∧R2,0))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R2,1 ∧ T1,2))⇒ (T1,2 ∧R1,2))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ T2,1))⇒ (T2,1 ∧R2,1)))
φTS3 ≡ XG (((Y(R1,0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1))∧
((Y(R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ (¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0))∧
((Y(R2,0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ (¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2))∧
((Y(R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ (¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0))∧
((Y(R2,1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ (¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2))∧
((Y(R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ (¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1)))
φTS4 ≡ XG (((YT0,1)⇒ R0,1)∧
((YT1,0)⇒ R1,0)∧
((YT0,2)⇒ R0,2)∧
((YT2,0)⇒ R2,0)∧
((YT1,2)⇒ R1,2)∧
((YT2,1)⇒ R2,1))
φTS5 ≡ XG (((Y(¬M0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1))∧
((Y(¬M1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ (¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0))∧
((Y(¬M0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ (¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2))∧
((Y(¬M2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ (¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0))∧
((Y(¬M1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ (¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2))∧
((Y(¬M2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ (¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1)))
CHAPTER 6. ASYNCHRONOUS NETWORK FLOODING 90
φround ≡ G ¬((T0,1 ∨ T1,0 ∨ T0,2 ∨ T2,0 ∨ T1,2 ∨ T2,1)∧
(¬R0,1 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬R2,1))
φinit ≡ (M0 ∧ ¬M1 ∧ ¬M2)∧
(¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0∧
¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0∧
¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1)
For the synchronous case, instantiating the φm and φi of the previous chapter
yields:
φi ≡ (M s0 ∧ ¬M s1 ∧ ¬M s2 )∧
(¬S0,1 ∧ ¬S1,0 ∧ ¬S0,2 ∧ ¬S2,0 ∧ ¬S1,2 ∧ ¬S2,1)
φm ≡ (XG( (M s0 ⇔ S1,0 ∨ S2,0)∧
(M s1 ⇔ S0,1 ∨ S2,1)∧
(M s2 ⇔ S0,2 ∨ S1,2)) ) ∧
(XG( (S0,1 ⇔ Y(M s0 ∧ ¬S1,0))∧
(S1,0 ⇔ Y(M s1 ∧ ¬S0,1))∧
(S2,0 ⇔ Y(M s2 ∧ ¬S0,2))∧
(S0,2 ⇔ Y(M s0 ∧ ¬S2,0))∧
(S1,2 ⇔ Y(M s1 ∧ ¬S2,1))∧
(S2,1 ⇔ Y(M s2 ∧ ¬S1,2))) )
By equation (6.8),(6.9) above, in order to demonstrate that no asynchronous run
terminates before the synchronous run, we need to prove the following formula
with the substitutions for φS2 , φTS1 -φTS5 , φround , φinit , φi and φm, as given above:
¬( φS2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS2 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS4 ∧ φTS5 ∧ φround ∧ φinit ∧ φm ∧ φi
⇒
F( (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0 ∧ ¬T0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0 ∧ ¬T1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1)∧
(¬M0 ∧ ¬M1 ∧ ¬M2) ∧ (M s0 ∨M s1 ∨M s2 ) ) )
This proof has been carried out using NuSMV as shown in code in Appendix
C Section C.1 and returns False, giving an asynchronous run which terminates
before the synchronous run.
6.4.1.2 Asynchronous Cannot Terminate Before Synchronous
We will formally verify the network Figure 5.2 below using NuSMV:
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Figure 6.3: Figure of four nodes
This does not have an asynchronous run which terminates in fewer rounds
than the synchronous run with initial node 0 for both. We have the following
propositions for the asynchronous and synchronous cases, respectively:
Asynchronous : T0,1, T1,0, T0,2, T2,0, T1,2, T2,1, T1,3, T3,1, T2,3, T3,2
R0,1, R1,0, R0,2, R2,0, R1,2, R2,1, R1,3, R3,1, R2,3, R3,2,
M0,M1,M2,M3
Synchronous : S0,1, S1,0, S0,2, S2,0, S1,2, S2,1, S1,3, S3,1, S2,3, S3,2,
M s0 ,M
s
1 ,M
s
2 ,M
s
3
For the asynchronous case, instantiating the definitions of φS2 of Subsection 6.3.2,
φTS1 -φTS5 and φinit of Subsection 6.3.3, and φround of Subsection 6.3.5, we have:
φS2 ≡ XG ((M0 ⇔ R1,0 ∨R2,0)∧
(M1 ⇔ R0,1 ∨R2,1 ∨R3,1)∧
(M2 ⇔ S0,2 ∨ S1,2 ∨ S3,2)∧
(M3 ⇔ S1,3 ∨ S2,3))
φTS1 ≡ XG (((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ ((T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1) ∨ (R0,1 ∧ ¬T0,1)))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ ((T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0) ∨ (R1,0 ∧ ¬T1,0)))∧
((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ ((T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2) ∨ (R0,2 ∧ ¬T0,2)))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ ((T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0) ∨ (R2,0 ∧ ¬T2,0)))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R2,1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ ((T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2) ∨ (R1,2 ∧ ¬T1,2)))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ ((T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1) ∨ (R2,1 ∧ ¬T2,1)))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R3,1 ∧ ¬T1,3))⇒ ((T1,3 ∧ ¬R1,3) ∨ (R1,3 ∧ ¬T1,3)))∧
((Y(M3 ∧ ¬R1,3 ∧ ¬T3,1))⇒ ((T3,1 ∧ ¬R3,1) ∨ (R3,1 ∧ ¬T3,1)))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R3,2 ∧ ¬T2,3))⇒ ((T2,3 ∧ ¬R2,3) ∨ (R2,3 ∧ ¬T2,3)))∧
((Y(M3 ∧ ¬R2,3 ∧ ¬T3,2))⇒ ((T3,2 ∧ ¬R3,2) ∨ (R3,2 ∧ ¬T3,2))))
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φTS2 ≡ XG (((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ T0,1))⇒ (T0,1 ∧R0,1))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ T1,0))⇒ (T1,0 ∧R1,0))∧
((Y(M0 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ T0,2))⇒ (T0,2 ∧R0,2))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ T2,0))⇒ (T2,0 ∧R2,0))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R2,1 ∧ T1,2))⇒ (T1,2 ∧R1,2))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ T2,1))⇒ (T2,1 ∧R2,1))∧
((Y(M1 ∧ ¬R3,1 ∧ T1,3))⇒ (T1,3 ∧R1,3))∧
((Y(M3 ∧ ¬R1,3 ∧ T3,1))⇒ (T3,1 ∧R3,1))∧
((Y(M2 ∧ ¬R3,2 ∧ T2,3))⇒ (T2,3 ∧R2,3))∧
((Y(M3 ∧ ¬R2,3 ∧ T3,2))⇒ (T3,2 ∧R3,2)))
φTS3 ≡ XG (((Y(R1,0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1))∧
((Y(R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ (¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0))∧
((Y(R2,0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ (¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2))∧
((Y(R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ (¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0))∧
((Y(R2,1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ (¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2))∧
((Y(R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ (¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1))∧
((Y(R3,1 ∧ ¬T1,3))⇒ (¬T1,3 ∧ ¬R1,3))∧
((Y(R1,3 ∧ ¬T3,1))⇒ (¬T3,1 ∧ ¬R3,1))∧
((Y(R3,2 ∧ ¬T2,3))⇒ (¬T2,3 ∧ ¬R2,3))∧
((Y(R2,3 ∧ ¬T3,2))⇒ (¬T3,2 ∧ ¬R3,2)))
φTS4 ≡ XG (((YT0,1)⇒ R0,1)∧
((YT1,0)⇒ R1,0)∧
((YT0,2)⇒ R0,2)∧
((YT2,0)⇒ R2,0)∧
((YT1,2)⇒ R1,2)∧
((YT2,1)⇒ R2,1)∧
((YT1,3)⇒ R1,3)∧
((YT3,1)⇒ R3,1)∧
((YT2,3)⇒ R2,3)∧
((YT3,2)⇒ R3,2))
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φTS5 ≡ XG (((Y(¬M0 ∧ ¬T0,1))⇒ (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1))∧
((Y(¬M1 ∧ ¬T1,0))⇒ (¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0))∧
((Y(¬M0 ∧ ¬T0,2))⇒ (¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2))∧
((Y(¬M2 ∧ ¬T2,0))⇒ (¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0))∧
((Y(¬M1 ∧ ¬T1,2))⇒ (¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2))∧
((Y(¬M2 ∧ ¬T2,1))⇒ (¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1))∧
((Y(¬M1 ∧ ¬T1,3))⇒ (¬T1,3 ∧ ¬R1,3))∧
((Y(¬M3 ∧ ¬T3,1))⇒ (¬T3,1 ∧ ¬R3,1))∧
((Y(¬M2 ∧ ¬T2,3))⇒ (¬T2,3 ∧ ¬R2,3))∧
((Y(¬M3 ∧ ¬T3,2))⇒ (¬T3,2 ∧ ¬R3,2)))
φround ≡ G ¬((T0,1 ∨ T1,0 ∨ T0,2 ∨ T2,0 ∨ T1,2 ∨ T2,1 ∨ T1,3 ∨ T3,1 ∨ T2,3 ∨ T3,2)∧
(¬R0,1 ∧ ¬R1,0 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬R2,0 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬R2,1 ∧ ¬R1,3
∧¬R3,1 ∧ ¬R2,3 ∧ ¬R3,2))
φinit ≡ (M0 ∧ ¬M1 ∧ ¬M2 ∧ ¬M3)∧
(¬T0,1 ∧ ¬R0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0 ∧ ¬R1,0∧
¬T0,2 ∧ ¬R0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0 ∧ ¬R2,0∧
¬T1,2 ∧ ¬R1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1 ∧ ¬R2,1∧
¬T1,3 ∧ ¬R1,3 ∧ ¬T3,1 ∧ ¬R3,1∧
¬T2,3 ∧ ¬R2,3 ∧ ¬T3,2 ∧ ¬R3,2)
For the synchronous case, instantiating the φm and φi of the previous chapter
yields:
φi ≡ (M s0 ∧ ¬M s1 ∧ ¬M s2 ∧ ¬M s3 )∧
(¬S0,1 ∧ ¬S1,0 ∧ ¬S0,2 ∧ ¬S2,0 ∧ ¬S1,2 ∧ ¬S2,1 ∧ ¬S1,3 ∧ ¬S3,1 ∧ ¬S2,3 ∧ ¬S3,2)
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φm ≡ (XG( (M s0 ⇔ S1,0 ∨ S2,0)∧
(M s1 ⇔ S0,1 ∨ S2,1 ∨ S3,1)∧
(M s2 ⇔ S0,2 ∨ S1,2 ∨ S3,2)∧
(M s3 ⇔ S1,3 ∨ S2,3)) ) ∧
(XG( (S0,1 ⇔ Y(M s0 ∧ ¬S1,0))∧
(S1,0 ⇔ Y(M s1 ∧ ¬S0,1))∧
(S2,0 ⇔ Y(M s2 ∧ ¬S0,2))∧
(S0,2 ⇔ Y(M s0 ∧ ¬S2,0))∧
(S1,2 ⇔ Y(M s1 ∧ ¬S2,1))∧
(S2,1 ⇔ Y(M s2 ∧ ¬S1,2))∧
(S1,3 ⇔ Y(M s1 ∧ ¬S3,1))∧
(S3,1 ⇔ Y(M s3 ∧ ¬S1,3))∧
(S2,3 ⇔ Y(M s2 ∧ ¬S3,2))∧
(S3,2 ⇔ Y(M s3 ∧ ¬S2,3))) )
By equation (6.8),(6.9) above, in order to demonstrate that no asynchronous run
terminates before the synchronous run, we need to prove the following formula
with the substitutions for φS2 , φTS1 -φTS5 , φround , φinit , φi and φm, as given above:
¬( φS2 ∧ φTS1 ∧ φTS2 ∧ φTS3 ∧ φTS4 ∧ φTS5 ∧ φround ∧ φinit ∧ φm ∧ φi
⇒
F( (¬T0,1 ∧ ¬T1,0 ∧ ¬T0,2 ∧ ¬T2,0 ∧ ¬T1,2 ∧ ¬T2,1 ∧ ¬T1,3 ∧ ¬T3,1 ∧ ¬T2,3 ∧ ¬T3,2)∧
(¬M0 ∧ ¬M1 ∧ ¬M2 ∧ ¬M3) ∧ (M s0 ∨M s1 ∨M s2 ∨M s3 ) ) )
This proof has been carried out using NuSMV as shown in code in Appendix C
Section C.2 and returns True, proving that no asynchronous run terminates before
the synchronous run.
6.5 Conclusions
We have chosen a specification method for asynchronous network flooding that is
directed at performing an analysis of the termination times for such systems. Tak-
ing our cue from the synchronous case, we decided to use the number of rounds as
the measure of time to termination. This has meant giving a plausible definition
of ‘rounds’ for the asynchronous case which corresponds to the accepted defini-
tion of rounds when asynchronous flooding executes as a synchronous system. As
all messages that arrive ‘at the same time’ are aggregated into the same round,
this has ruled out standard process calculi approaches such as CSP [1] and CCS
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[2], which only allow two processes at a time to synchronize the sending and re-
ceiving of messages. Flooding would require a node (as a process) to be able to
synchronize the sending and receiving of messages with many nodes (processes)
in the same round. Thus, the notion of a round would be lost and it would be
difficult to recover a count of rounds, each of which would comprise multiple sends
and receives. Indeed, the model checker, NuSMV, has an asynchronous process
description language which can be used if desired, but the interleaved model of
concurrency that it implements would have the same problem with specifying
rounds. We have used NuSMV purely as a temporal logic prover for direct spe-
cifications of temporal constraints. In contrast to CSP and CCS, the calculus of
broadcasting systems (CBS) [82] does allow one-to-many communication, mainly
for sending to all processes (nodes), but processes can only send one at a time.
Petri nets [83] also allows many messages to be sent in one instant, but messages
(‘tokens’) are either sent from all incoming edges (‘arcs’) or none.
In our previous work on synchronous flooding, considerable emphasis was
placed on specifying constraints on graph topologies, thereby defining multiple
topologies for a given set of network nodes so that termination properties could be
proved for all topologies. Here, we have compared the termination times between
an asynchronous and a synchronous network by testing the validity of a formula
of the form (see equation (6.8),(6.9)):
¬(Φa(. . . , Tg,h, . . . , Rg,h, . . . ,Mg, . . .) ∧ Φs(. . . , Sg,h, . . . ,Mg, . . .)
⇒ Θa then s) (6.10)
where Φa defines all (non-deterministic) asynchronous runs, Φs defines a unique
(deterministic) synchronous run, and Θa then s asserts that an asynchronous run
terminates before the synchronous run. So, with the negation, the formula (6.10)
states that no asynchronous runs can terminate before the synchronous. If the
formula is False, i.e., not valid, there is some asynchronous run that can terminate
before the (unique) synchronous run. If we added edge propositional variables
Eg,h to Φs so that multiple topologies and therefore many synchronous runs were
defined by Φs, then if the resulting formula:
¬Φa(. . . , Tg,h, . . . , Rg,h, . . . ,Mg, . . .) ∧ Φs(. . . , Eg,h, . . . , Sg,h, . . . ,Mg, . . .)
⇒ Θa then s) (6.11)
returned False, that would mean that some asynchronous run would terminate
before some synchronous run. If (6.11) returned True, it would mean that all
synchronous runs terminate before all asynchronous runs. To prove that some
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asynchronous run terminates before all synchronous runs would require a more
expressive temporal logic such as QPTL [84], which is not supported by NuSMV
and for which verification is much more problematic.
Finally, we have only specified a model of bounded asynchronous flooding
where a sent message can be delayed one round in a non-deterministic manner.
This could be extended to delays of up to a larger fixed number of rounds. Al-
though different configurations of messages at nodes could result from the possib-
ility of different lengths of delays, it is not clear whether the properties that we
have focussed on in this work, namely the fewest rounds to the termination of a
run, would be affected.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter provides a general set of conclusions for the research completed in this
thesis. The individual chapters in the thesis contain more detailed conclusions, to
which the reader is also referred.
Temporal logic has been used in specification and verification of properties of
systems which have interacting components and environment. These systems are
referred to as reactive systems. Safety-critical systems is a type of the reactive
systems where safety is critical and fault tolerance is avoided as errors can cause
loss of people lives and/or huge financial loss. This research focused on distributed
systems network algorithms. Distributed systems have components that interact
with each other and the environment. The use of linear temporal logic in this
research showed how powerful is temporal logic in specifying properties of network
algorithms. Both safety and liveness properties were specified and verified in this
research. This work presented novel approaches to specify and verify these two
important properties
This first part of this work handled transactions on data items being accessed
in a concurrent manner. The concurrency of such a scenario is representative of
distributed network systems where shared memory is used. Concurrent access of
shared resources makes handling the different transactions a very difficult task.
The protocol we presented has a certain similarity when the data items are shared
resources. The data items are stored on routers’ memories which are accessed by
unlimited number of transactions in a concurrent manner. We presented a protocol
that can be used to detect cycles caused by conflicting transactions accessing the
shared resources. The use temporal logic and the model checker NuSMV to model
the network of routers accessed by unlimited number of transactions according to
the gap theory presented the first contribution novelty.
On the other hand, the other type of distributed network systems uses message
passing. We modelled the well-known flooding algorithm, which uses message
passing between different network nodes to accomplish its required tasks. The
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message is sent from one (initial) node to all other nodes in the network. We
specified the flooding algorithm using linear temporal logic and, using the NuSMV
model checker, subsequently verified these specifications. We successfully specified
the termination property for network flooding, where now we can determine if
network flooding on a given topology will terminate or otherwise. This presented
the second contribution novelty as researchers didn’t consider using temporal logic
to specify properties of the memory-less flooding algorithm. We also specified
asynchronous flooding and compared its termination with the previously described
synchronous flooding. This presented the third contribution in this research.
We can see that temporal logic can be used in the specification and verifica-
tion of network algorithms. In the case that a property was not met, the model
checker gives a counterexample showing the states that cause the error. The states
represent a trace which can be helpful in defining the error. This provides some
considerable benefit over other techniques where it is not otherwise possible to
model such problems. Although temporal logic is powerful and model checkers
have improved over the past few decades, the state explosion problem limits prob-
lems where there are a large number of states to be specified and verified. Even
with the specifications presented in this research, and the use of one of the most
powerful model checkers available, NuSMV, proofs will only be possible in practice
for fairly small sizes of network. A strong mathematical background can help in
solving and proving some problems where data is accessed in different ways other
than what is presented in this work. Some problems faced during this research
will need more time and effort to tackle in addition to higher mathematical skills.
7.1 Future work
The contribution of Chapter 4 has different potential applications. Due to the
limitation of the order in which the transactions gain access to the data items,
this research opens the door to further research in this area. Future work will
consider other situations where data is accessed in a different manner.
The flooding problem gives an excellent example of a very basic algorithm on
a network node - on receipt of a message, the node sends on the message to all
its neighbours except for those from which it received the message. In the same
way that network topologies can be easily modified by altering the topological
constraints, future work could also investigate whether the code/algorithm at the
nodes could be changed by supplying new, possibly more sophisticated, message-
processing constraints which can then be verified.
In Chapter 6, we have only specified a model of bounded asynchronous flooding
where a sent message can be delayed one round in a non-deterministic manner.
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Future work could be extended to consider delays of up to a larger, fixed number
of rounds. Although different configurations of the messages at the nodes could
result from the possibility of different lengths of delays, it is not clear whether the
properties that we have focussed on in this work, namely the fewest number of
rounds to the termination of a run, would be affected.
Finally, future work could also attempt to develop tools to support the tem-
poral logic analysis of distributed software/algorithms. For example, a tool could
input pseudo-code for the algorithm at all nodes and output an appropriate
NuSMV script for the network where each node has the behaviour of the algorithm.
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Appendix A
Routing protocol encoding into
LTL
[]
We used MODULE move(Tr,n,Ta,Tb,Tc). The variables (Tr,n,Ta,Tb,Tc) rep-
resent:
Tr: a transaction that is currently in process.
n: an integer indicating the number of the transaction.
Ta, Tb, Tc: other transactions that are waiting in the queue.
T1,T2,T3, T4: transactions number one, two, three and four.
r1x1: T1 reads item x1.
w1x1: T1 writes on item x1.
The code is shown here:
{MODULE move(Tr,n,Ta,Tb,Tc)
ASSIGN
next(Tr):=case
Tr= begin1 &n= 1 &(!(Tr=r1x3) & (!(Ta=r2x3)) & (!(Tb=r3x3)) ) : r1x3;
Tr= r1x3 &n= 1 : w1x3;
Tr= w1x3 &n= 1 : r1x4;
Tr= r1x4 &n= 1 : w1x4;
Tr= w1x4 &n= 1 : end1;
Tr= end1 : begin1;
Tr= begin2 &n= 2 &(!(Tr=r2x3) & (!(Ta=r1x3)) & (!(Tb=r3x3)) ) : r2x3;
Tr= r2x3 &n= 2 : w2x3;
Tr= w2x3 &n= 2 : r2x4;
Tr= r2x4 &n= 2 : w2x4;
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Tr= w2x4 &n= 2 : end2;
Tr= end2 : begin2;
Tr= begin3 &n= 3 &(!(Tr=r3x3) & (!(Ta=r1x3)) & (!(Tb=r2x3)) ) : r3x3;
Tr= r3x3 &n= 3 : w3x3;
Tr= w3x3 &n= 3 : r3x5;
Tr= r3x5 &n= 3 : w3x5;
Tr= w3x5 &n= 3 : end3;
Tr= end3 : begin3;
Tr= begin4 &n= 4 &(!(Tr=r4x4) & (!(Ta=r1x4)) & (!(Tb=r2x4)) ) : r4x4;
Tr= r4x4 &n= 4 : w4x4;
Tr= w4x4 &n= 4 : r4x5;
Tr= r4x5 &n= 4 : w4x5;
Tr= w4x5 &n= 4 : end4;
Tr= end4 : begin4;
TRUE : Tr;
esac;
MODULE main
VAR
T1 : {begin1,r1x3,w1x3,r1x4,w1x4,end1};
T2 : {begin2,r2x3,w2x3,r2x4,w2x4,end2};
T3 : {begin3,r3x3,w3x3,r3x5,w3x5,end3};
T4 : {begin4,r4x4,w4x4,r4x5,w4x5,end4};
x: process move(T1,1,T2,T3,T4);
y: process move(T2,2,T1,T3,T4);
z: process move(T3,3,T1,T2,T4);
w: process move(T4,4,T1,T2,T3);
ASSIGN
init(T1):= begin1;
init(T2):= begin2;
init(T3):= begin3;
init(T4):= begin4;
FAIRNESS (T1=end1)
FAIRNESS (T2=end2)
FAIRNESS (T3=end3)
FAIRNESS (T4=end4)
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LTLSPEC F( (T1=r1x3)->X(T1=w1x3)->X(T3=r3x3)->X(T3=w3x3)->(T2=r2x3)->
X(T2=w2x3)->X(T2=r2x4)->X(T2=w2x4)->X(T1=r1x4)->X(T1=w1x4)->X(T4=r4x4)->
X(T4=w4x4)->X(T4=r4x5)->X(T4=w4x5)->(T3=r3x5)->X(T3=w3x5))
--T1
LTLSPEC G (((T1=r1x4) & O(T1=r1x3)) -> O(T1=w1x3))
--T2
LTLSPEC G (((T2=r2x4) & O(T2=r2x3)) -> O(T2=w2x3))
--T3
LTLSPEC G (((T3=r3x5) & O(T3=r3x5)) -> O(T3=w3x3))
--T4
LTLSPEC G (((T4=r4x5) & O(T4=r4x4)) -> O(T4=w4x4))
--T1
LTLSPEC G (T1=r1x3 -> (F (T1=w1x3 & F (T1=r1x4))))
--T2
LTLSPEC G (T2=r2x3 -> (F (T2=w2x3 & F (T2=r2x4))))
--T3
LTLSPEC G (T3=r3x3 -> (F (T3=w3x3 & F (T3=r3x5))))
--T4
LTLSPEC G (T4=r4x4 -> (F (T4=w4x4 & F (T4=r4x5))))
---T1
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x3) -> O(T1=begin1))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3) -> O(T1=r1x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x4) -> O(T1=w1x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x4) -> O(T1=r1x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=end1) -> O(T1=w1x4))
--T2
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x3) -> O(T2=begin2))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x3) -> O(T2=r2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x4) -> O(T2=w2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x4) -> O(T2=r2x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=end2) -> O(T2=w2x4))
--T3
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x3) -> O(T3=begin3))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x3) -> O(T3=r3x3))
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LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x5) -> O(T3=w3x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x5) -> O(T3=r3x5))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=end3) -> O(T3=w3x5))
---T4
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x4) -> O(T4=begin4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x4) -> O(T4=r4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x5) -> O(T4=w4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x5) -> O(T4=r4x5))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=end4) -> O(T4=w4x5))
--T1
LTLSPEC G ((T1=begin1) -> X!((T1=r1x3)&(T1=w1x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x3) -> X!((T1=w1x3)&(T1=r1x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x4) -> X!((T1=w1x4)&(T1=end1)))
--T2
LTLSPEC G ((T2=begin2) -> X!((T2=r2x3)&(T2=w2x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x3) -> X!((T2=w2x3)&(T1=r2x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x4) -> X!((T2=w2x4)&(T2=end2)))
--T3
LTLSPEC G ((T3=begin3) -> X!((T3=r3x3)&(T3=w3x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x3) -> X!((T3=w3x3)&(T3=r3x5)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x5) -> X!((T3=w3x5)&(T3=end3)))
--T4
LTLSPEC G ((T4=begin4) -> X!((T4=r4x4)&(T4=w4x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x4) -> X!((T4=w4x4)&(T4=r4x5)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x5) -> X!((T4=w4x5)&(T4=end4)))
once by a transaction
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3 & O(T1=r1x3)) -> (F!(T1=r1x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x4 & O(T1=r1x4)) -> (F!(T1=r1x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x3 & O(T2=r2x3)) -> (F!(T2=r2x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x4 & O(T2=r2x4)) -> (F!(T2=r2x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x3 & O(T3=r3x3)) -> (F!(T3=r3x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x5 & O(T3=r3x5)) -> (F!(T3=r3x5)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x4 & O(T4=r4x4)) -> (F!(T4=r4x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x5 & O(T4=r4x5)) -> (F!(T4=r4x5)))
--T1
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x3) -> F(T1=r1x3))
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LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3) -> F(T1=w1x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=r1x4) -> F(T1=r1x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x4) -> F(T1=w1x4))
--T2
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x3) -> F(T2=r2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x3) -> F(T2=w2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x4) -> F(T2=r2x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x4) -> F(T2=w2x4))
--T3
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x3) -> F(T3=r3x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x3) -> F(T3=w3x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x5) -> F(T3=r3x5))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x5) -> F(T3=w3x5))
--T4
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x4) -> F(T4=r4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x4) -> F(T4=w4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x5) -> F(T4=r4x5))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x5) -> F(T4=w4x5))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3) -> O!(T2=r2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x3) -> O!(T3=r3x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=w3x3) -> O!(T2=r2x3))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x4) -> O!(T1=r1x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T2=w2x4) -> O!(T3=r4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T1=w1x4) -> O!(T4=r4x4))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=w4x5) -> O!(T3=r3x5))
-- We can also check in another way as follows:
--X3
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x3 & O(T1=r1x3)) -> (F!(T1=w1x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x3 & O(T1=r1x3)) -> (F!(T1=w1x3)))
LTLSPEC G ((T3=r3x3 & O(T2=r2x3)) -> (F!(T2=w2x3)))
--X4
LTLSPEC G ((T2=r2x4 & O(T1=r1x4)) -> (F!(T1=w1x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x4 & O(T1=r1x4)) -> (F!(T1=w1x4)))
LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x4 & O(T2=r2x4)) -> (F!(T2=w2x4)))
--X5
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LTLSPEC G ((T4=r4x5 & O(T3=r3x5)) -> (F!(T3=w3x5)))
-----The gap G=1 tis means that we can have a cycle of length= 3
--- Here we check for this cycle only.
---these create the cycle if we put ! before G
--1321
LTLSPEC !G((T1=r1x3)->F(T3=w3x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T1=w1x4))
--if we remove "!" before G it will execute and give TRUE , i.e,
--doesn’t check for cycle.
--- this is continuing to check of n length cycle
--1241
LTLSPEC G((T1=r1x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T1=w1x4))
--2141
LTLSPEC G((T2=r2x3)->F(T1=w1x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T2=w2x4))
--3242
LTLSPEC G((T3=r3x3)->F(T2=w2x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T3=w3x5))
--3143
LTLSPEC G((T3=r3x3)->F(T1=w1x3)->F(T4=w4x4)->F(T3=w3x5))
--4234
LTLSPEC G((T4=r4x4)->F(T2=w2x4)->F(T3=w3x5)->F(T4=w4x5))
FAIRNESS running
Appendix B
Synchronous Flooding Algorithm
encoding into LTL
[]
B.1 Topology1 terminates before Topology2
with initial node =0
[]
MODULE main
VAR
-- Topology #1 nodes:
n1_0: node(TRUE);
n1_1: node(FALSE);
n1_2: node(FALSE);
n1_3: node(FALSE);
n1_4: node(FALSE);
-- Topology #1 edges:
e1_01: edge(n1_0, n1_1);
e1_02: edge(n1_0, n1_2);
e1_03: edge(n1_0, n1_3);
e1_04: edge(n1_0, n1_4);
e1_14: edge(n1_1, n1_4);
e1_23: edge(n1_2, n1_3);
-- Topology #2 nodes:
n2_0: node(TRUE);
114
APPENDIX B. SYNCHRONOUS FLOODING ALGORITHMENCODING INTO LTL115
n2_1: node(FALSE);
n2_2: node(FALSE);
n2_3: node(FALSE);
n2_4: node(FALSE);
-- Topology #2 edges:
e2_01: edge(n2_0, n2_1);
e2_04: edge(n2_0, n2_4);
e2_12: edge(n2_1, n2_2);
e2_23: edge(n2_2, n2_3);
e2_34: edge(n2_3, n2_4);
ASSIGN
-- Topology #1 rules:
next(n1_0.has_message) := next(e1_01.send_b_to_a | e1_02.send_b_to_a |
e1_03.send_b_to_a | e1_04.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_1.has_message) := next(e1_01.send_a_to_b | e1_14.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_2.has_message) := next(e1_02.send_a_to_b | e1_23.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_3.has_message) := next(e1_03.send_a_to_b | e1_23.send_a_to_b);
next(n1_4.has_message) := next(e1_04.send_a_to_b | e1_14.send_a_to_b);
-- Topology #2 rules:
next(n2_0.has_message) := next(e2_01.send_b_to_a | e2_04.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_1.has_message) := next(e2_01.send_a_to_b | e2_12.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_2.has_message) := next(e2_12.send_a_to_b | e2_23.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_3.has_message) := next(e2_23.send_a_to_b | e2_34.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_4.has_message) := next(e2_04.send_a_to_b | e2_34.send_a_to_b);
LTLSPEC F (
(!n1_0.has_message & !n1_1.has_message & !n1_2.has_message &
!n1_3.has_message & !n1_4.has_message) &
(n2_0.has_message | n2_1.has_message |
n2_2.has_message | n2_3.has_message | n2_4.has_message)
);
MODULE node(has_message_initially)
VAR
has_message: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(has_message) := has_message_initially;
MODULE edge(node_a, node_b)
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VAR
send_a_to_b: boolean;
send_b_to_a: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(send_a_to_b) := FALSE;
init(send_b_to_a) := FALSE;
next(send_a_to_b) := node_a.has_message & !send_b_to_a;
next(send_b_to_a) := node_b.has_message & !send_a_to_b;
B.2 Topology2 terminates before Topology1
with initial node =0
[]
MODULE main
VAR
-- Topology #1 nodes:
n1_0: node(TRUE);
n1_1: node(FALSE);
n1_2: node(FALSE);
n1_3: node(FALSE);
n1_4: node(FALSE);
-- Topology #1 edges:
e1_01: edge(n1_0, n1_1);
e1_02: edge(n1_0, n1_2);
e1_03: edge(n1_0, n1_3);
e1_04: edge(n1_0, n1_4);
e1_14: edge(n1_1, n1_4);
e1_23: edge(n1_2, n1_3);
-- Topology #2 nodes:
n2_0: node(TRUE);
n2_1: node(FALSE);
n2_2: node(FALSE);
n2_3: node(FALSE);
n2_4: node(FALSE);
-- Topology #2 edges:
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e2_01: edge(n2_0, n2_1);
e2_04: edge(n2_0, n2_4);
e2_12: edge(n2_1, n2_2);
e2_23: edge(n2_2, n2_3);
e2_34: edge(n2_3, n2_4);
ASSIGN
-- Topology #1 rules:
next(n1_0.has_message) := next(e1_01.send_b_to_a | e1_02.send_b_to_a |
e1_03.send_b_to_a | e1_04.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_1.has_message) := next(e1_01.send_a_to_b | e1_14.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_2.has_message) := next(e1_02.send_a_to_b | e1_23.send_b_to_a);
next(n1_3.has_message) := next(e1_03.send_a_to_b | e1_23.send_a_to_b);
next(n1_4.has_message) := next(e1_04.send_a_to_b | e1_14.send_a_to_b);
-- Topology #2 rules:
next(n2_0.has_message) := next(e2_01.send_b_to_a | e2_04.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_1.has_message) := next(e2_01.send_a_to_b | e2_12.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_2.has_message) := next(e2_12.send_a_to_b | e2_23.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_3.has_message) := next(e2_23.send_a_to_b | e2_34.send_b_to_a);
next(n2_4.has_message) := next(e2_04.send_a_to_b | e2_34.send_a_to_b);
LTLSPEC F (
(!n2_0.has_message & !n2_1.has_message & !n2_2.has_message &
!n2_3.has_message & !n2_4.has_message) &
(n1_0.has_message | n1_1.has_message | n1_2.has_message |
n1_3.has_message | n1_4.has_message)
);
MODULE node(has_message_initially)
VAR
has_message: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(has_message) := has_message_initially;
MODULE edge(node_a, node_b)
VAR
send_a_to_b: boolean;
send_b_to_a: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(send_a_to_b) := FALSE;
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init(send_b_to_a) := FALSE;
next(send_a_to_b) := node_a.has_message & !send_b_to_a;
next(send_b_to_a) := node_b.has_message & !send_a_to_b;
B.3 Topology1 terminates before Topology2
regardless of initial node
[]
--- This code checks if topology1 terminates before
--- topology2 regardless of starting state
MODULE main
VAR
t1: topology1;
t2: topology2;
LTLSPEC F (t1.is_terminated & !t2.is_terminated);
--LTLSPEC F (t2.is_terminated & !t1.is_terminated);
MODULE topology1
VAR
n0: node;
n1: node;
n2: node;
n3: node;
n4: node;
e01: edge(n0, n1);
e02: edge(n0, n2);
e03: edge(n0, n3);
e04: edge(n0, n4);
e14: edge(n1, n4);
e23: edge(n2, n3);
INIT
count(n0.has_message, n1.has_message, n2.has_message, n3.has_message,
n4.has_message) = 1;
ASSIGN
next(n0.has_message) := next(e01.send_b_to_a | e02.send_b_to_a |
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e03.send_b_to_a | e04.send_b_to_a);
next(n1.has_message) := next(e01.send_a_to_b | e14.send_b_to_a);
next(n2.has_message) := next(e02.send_a_to_b | e23.send_b_to_a);
next(n3.has_message) := next(e03.send_a_to_b | e23.send_a_to_b);
next(n4.has_message) := next(e04.send_a_to_b | e14.send_a_to_b);
DEFINE
is_terminated := !n0.has_message & !n1.has_message & !n2.has_message &
!n3.has_message & !n4.has_message;
MODULE topology2
VAR
n0: node;
n1: node;
n2: node;
n3: node;
n4: node;
e01: edge(n0, n1);
e04: edge(n0, n4);
e12: edge(n1, n2);
e23: edge(n2, n3);
e34: edge(n3, n4);
INIT
count(n0.has_message, n1.has_message, n2.has_message, n3.has_message,
n4.has_message) = 1;
ASSIGN
next(n0.has_message) := next(e01.send_b_to_a | e04.send_b_to_a);
next(n1.has_message) := next(e01.send_a_to_b | e12.send_b_to_a);
next(n2.has_message) := next(e12.send_a_to_b | e23.send_b_to_a);
next(n3.has_message) := next(e23.send_a_to_b | e34.send_b_to_a);
next(n4.has_message) := next(e04.send_a_to_b | e34.send_a_to_b);
DEFINE
is_terminated := !n0.has_message & !n1.has_message & !n2.has_message &
!n3.has_message & !n4.has_message;
MODULE node
VAR
has_message: boolean;
MODULE edge(node_a, node_b)
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VAR
send_a_to_b: boolean;
send_b_to_a: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(send_a_to_b) := FALSE;
init(send_b_to_a) := FALSE;
next(send_a_to_b) := node_a.has_message & !send_b_to_a;
next(send_b_to_a) := node_b.has_message & !send_a_to_b;
Appendix C
Asynchronous flooding algorithm
encoding into LTL
[]
C.1 Asynchronous Can Terminate Before
Synchronous
[]
MODULE main
VAR
-- Declare models:
async: model_with_3_nodes(0);
sync: model_with_3_nodes(0);
ASSIGN
-- Define edges of async model:
init(async.e01.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e02.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e12.__mode) := asynchronous;
-- Define edges of sync model:
init(sync.e01.__mode) := synchronous;
init(sync.e02.__mode) := synchronous;
init(sync.e12.__mode) := synchronous;
LTLSPEC
!F (async.is_terminated & !sync.is_terminated);
MODULE model_with_3_nodes(initially_active_node)
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VAR
n0: node(initially_active_node = 0);
n1: node(initially_active_node = 1);
n2: node(initially_active_node = 2);
e01: maybe_edge(n0, n1);
e02: maybe_edge(n0, n2);
e12: maybe_edge(n1, n2);
ASSIGN
next(n0.has_message) := next(e01.b_to_a.received | e02.b_to_a.received);
next(n1.has_message) := next(e01.a_to_b.received | e12.b_to_a.received);
next(n2.has_message) := next(e02.a_to_b.received | e12.a_to_b.received);
DEFINE
is_terminated := !n0.has_message & !n1.has_message & !n2.has_message;
INVAR
!is_terminated | !(
e01.__has_transmitting |
e02.__has_transmitting |
e12.__has_transmitting
);
JUSTICE
TRUE;
MODULE node(has_message_initially)
VAR
has_message: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(has_message) := has_message_initially;
MODULE maybe_edge(node_a, node_b)
FROZENVAR
__mode: {disabled, synchronous, asynchronous};
VAR
a_to_b: maybe_directed_subedge(node_a, __mode, b_to_a);
b_to_a: maybe_directed_subedge(node_b, __mode, a_to_b);
DEFINE
__has_transmitting := a_to_b.transmitting | b_to_a.transmitting;
MODULE maybe_directed_subedge(start, mode, reverse)
VAR
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transmitting: boolean;
received: boolean;
DEFINE
__should_send := (mode != disabled) & start.has_message & !reverse.received;
ASSIGN
init(transmitting) := FALSE;
init(received) := FALSE;
next(transmitting) := case
!__should_send : FALSE;
transmitting : TRUE;
TRUE : {FALSE, mode = asynchronous};
esac;
next(received) := __should_send xor transmitting xor next(transmitting);
C.2 Asynchronous Cannot Terminate Before
Synchronous
[]
--Asynchronous Cannot Terminate Before Synchronous
MODULE main
VAR
-- Declare models:
async: model_with_4_nodes(0);
sync: model_with_4_nodes(0);
ASSIGN
-- Define edges of async model:
init(async.e01.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e02.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e03.__mode) := disabled;
init(async.e12.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e13.__mode) := asynchronous;
init(async.e23.__mode) := asynchronous;
-- Define edges of sync model:
init(sync.e01.__mode) := synchronous;
init(sync.e02.__mode) := synchronous;
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init(sync.e03.__mode) := disabled;
init(sync.e12.__mode) := synchronous;
init(sync.e13.__mode) := synchronous;
init(sync.e23.__mode) := synchronous;
LTLSPEC
!F (async.is_terminated & !sync.is_terminated);
MODULE model_with_4_nodes(initially_active_node)
VAR
n0: node(initially_active_node = 0);
n1: node(initially_active_node = 1);
n2: node(initially_active_node = 2);
n3: node(initially_active_node = 3);
e01: maybe_edge(n0, n1);
e02: maybe_edge(n0, n2);
e03: maybe_edge(n0, n3);
e12: maybe_edge(n1, n2);
e13: maybe_edge(n1, n3);
e23: maybe_edge(n2, n3);
ASSIGN
next(n0.has_message) := next(e01.b_to_a.received | e02.b_to_a.received |
e03.b_to_a.received);
next(n1.has_message) := next(e01.a_to_b.received | e12.b_to_a.received |
e13.b_to_a.received);
next(n2.has_message) := next(e02.a_to_b.received | e12.a_to_b.received |
e23.b_to_a.received);
next(n3.has_message) := next(e03.a_to_b.received | e13.a_to_b.received |
e23.a_to_b.received);
DEFINE
is_terminated := !n0.has_message & !n1.has_message & !n2.has_message &
!n3.has_message;
INVAR
!is_terminated | !(
e01.__has_transmitting |
e02.__has_transmitting |
e03.__has_transmitting |
e12.__has_transmitting |
e13.__has_transmitting |
e23.__has_transmitting
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);
JUSTICE
TRUE;
MODULE node(has_message_initially)
VAR
has_message: boolean;
ASSIGN
init(has_message) := has_message_initially;
MODULE maybe_edge(node_a, node_b)
FROZENVAR
__mode: {disabled, synchronous, asynchronous};
VAR
a_to_b: maybe_directed_subedge(node_a, __mode, b_to_a);
b_to_a: maybe_directed_subedge(node_b, __mode, a_to_b);
DEFINE
__has_transmitting := a_to_b.transmitting | b_to_a.transmitting;
MODULE maybe_directed_subedge(start, mode, reverse)
VAR
transmitting: boolean;
received: boolean;
DEFINE
__should_send := (mode != disabled) & start.has_message & !reverse.received;
ASSIGN
init(transmitting) := FALSE;
init(received) := FALSE;
next(transmitting) := case
!__should_send : FALSE;
transmitting : TRUE;
TRUE : {FALSE, mode = asynchronous};
esac;
next(received) := __should_send xor transmitting xor next(transmitting);
